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ABSTRACT 
 
Wilderness: The History, Significance and Promise of an American Value.  
(August 2008) 
David Graham Henderson, B.A., Bryan College; M.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. John J. McDermott 
 
Wilderness has been a central value in the development of the American 
environmental tradition and has been established in our laws and institutions, first in the 
National Park System and then more extensively through the Wilderness Act.  Some 
have suggested that valuing wilderness, understood as nature without people or culture, 
is a peculiarly modern sentiment and that it is internally inconsistent, pathological, and a 
hindrance to solving real environmental problems.  Contrary to this approach, I defend a 
richer conception of wilderness that undermines each of these claims. Beginning with an 
etymology of wilderness and a history of the development of wilderness appreciation, I 
argue that wilderness is not essentially an absence of people or culture but the 
flourishing of natural purposes: land characterized by untamed animals and plants in 
untamed relations.  This interpretation of wilderness allows for a more cogent reading of 
the wilderness preservation tradition and the Wilderness Act.  It also elucidates 
philosophical difficulties surrounding the practices of wilderness management and 
ecological restoration. 
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 1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 I wish to speak a word for Nature, for absolute freedom and wildness … 
Henry David Thoreau1 
 
 Wilderness has a deep significance in the self-understanding of North America.  
Its mythopoetic richness is coupled with a deep ambivalence as to its meaning.  On the 
one hand, it is the chaos, the howling waste, which is conquered by the pioneer and the 
lawman to bring order and civilization, the void out of which our forefathers created 
something new on the face of the earth: a free nation.  On the other hand, it is sacred and 
holy, God’s creation undefiled by the works of fallen humanity.  Our mountain 
wildernesses are our American cathedrals, the monuments which best define our 
character.  Perhaps it is to the wilderness that we owe our rugged, can-do spirit.  
Somehow we manage to hold a deep affection both for the wilderness and for the effort 
by which it is destroyed. 
 This ambivalence towards wilderness, while uniquely significant in North 
American culture, did not originate with us.  It can be found in the very oldest bequests 
of civilization, as witness this passage from the Epic of Gilgamesh, where Gilgamesh 
first enters the forest: 
They stood in awe at the foot 
 
 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of The Chicago Manual of Style.  
1
 “Walking,” 31. 
 2 
 Of the green mountain.  Pleasure 
 Seemed to grow from fear for Gilgamesh. 
As when one comes upon a path in woods 
Unvisited by men, one is drawn near 
The lost and undiscovered in himself; 
He was revitalized by danger.2 
People have always found delight and fear mixed in the inhospitable beauty of the 
wilderness.  Evident also in the tale of Gilgamesh, in its portrayal of deforestation, is the 
awareness of the human ability to destroy the wilderness and so to bring environmental 
crises down upon our own heads.   
 The contemporary environmental movement represents a concerted effort to 
restrain this ability and to save some wild nature.  It has roots in several rich traditions, 
philosophical and religious, of thinking about nature’s value and its relationship to 
humanity.  Similar movements have grown in other regions of the world with interesting 
affinities and differences to that in North America.  I am not unaware of this; indeed I 
borrow heavily from a philosopher in the Australian tradition.  But for reasons of space 
and familiarity, I focus on the North American tradition of wilderness preservation.  Of 
course this entails considering many developments of Western civilization generally but 
always with an eye to their significance for understanding the American scene. 
 The seminal scholar in studies of the American wilderness tradition, as such, is 
Roderick Nash with his 1967 Wilderness and the American Mind.  I disagree with Nash 
                                                 
2
 quoted in Oelschlaeger, The Idea of Wilderness, 39. 
 3 
on many issues and use him as a foil frequently in this dissertation, but I have the 
greatest respect and gratitude for him and his work.  I could not have come to the 
understanding I have without having first read Nash.  His thorough presentation of the 
original sources always far outstrips what is required to support the interpretation 
offered, however strong.  I can only hope to become as fair a scholar. 
 In its critical aspect, this dissertation is written against two ideas, which are 
presently in vogue: the idea that wilderness appreciation is something novel, a 
peculiarity of our age, and the notion that this is an unhelpful, misanthropic pathology.  
The first is advanced by Nash and is associated with the claim that wilderness 
appreciation did not grow out of actual experience of wildernesses but from the romantic 
discontent with industrial urbanization.  Examples of wilderness antipathy are quoted in 
ancient sources, along with odes of praise for the pastoral, and the suggestion is that 
these represent the natural extent of human sentiment for nature.  But it is not hard to tell 
a different story with different sources.  Examples of wilderness appreciation and 
antipathy abound throughout history, often in the same places, as I have suggested above 
with the Gilgamesh example.  The contemporary devotion to wilderness does have novel 
aspects but is not entirely new.  Neither is it without feet in authentic wilderness 
experience.  The relevant sources for this sort of experience are not usually found among 
the conquering pioneers, however, who usually tended to antipathy, but among the 
explorer scientists and the naturalists.  They, unlike the pioneers, came to the wilderness 
not with a pre-scripted adversarial project but in open inquiry.  And the naturalists, I 
claim, have been and continue to be a major and underappreciated source of wilderness 
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appreciation.  They even inform the romantic poets, who have been much maligned as 
an inauthentic source for wilderness appreciation.  Note, for instance, that Wordsworth 
and Coleridge were apparently close readers of the American naturalist, William 
Bartram.3 
 The second target of my critique, the idea that wilderness appreciation is a 
decidedly unhelpful and problematic way of approaching environmental issues, is of 
more recent coinage.  Proponents argue that to call North America before European 
settlement a wilderness is simply to deny humanity and culture to the Native Americans.  
Valuing landscapes for their pristine, uninhabited character is a denial mechanism for 
dealing with the guilt of having wiped out the former inhabitants.  And by holding up 
untouched places as true nature, we avoid taking responsibility for our role in the 
industrial abuse of the greater part.  We also, the argument goes, preclude the possibility 
of reforming our relationship to nature, for if wilderness is the ideal, then human 
presence is, by definition, the problem. 
 Both of these ideas rely on an understanding of nature as the polar opposite of 
culture.  Wilderness, on these lines, is nothing more than the absence of humanity or 
human culture.  It is essentially a privation.  No wonder these critics find the affirmation 
of wilderness to be problematic; they hear it as synonymous with the rejection of culture 
and cultural value.  But wilderness is not the absence of people, even though it may 
often have no people in it.  The word wilderness literally means something made of wild 
beasts.  Wilderness is a positive description, a claim about the kind of animals and plants 
                                                 
3
 Smallwood, Natural History, 40. 
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that constitute the landscape and give it its distinctive character.  The contrast with 
people and culture is a practical matter, as people have often tended to clear out and 
avoid these sorts of plants and animals.  The American West was wilderness, not 
because there were no people, but because there were wolves and grizzly bears.  The 
remarkable fact is that many of the native peoples had cultures that ‘got along’ with 
these wild creatures. 
 Wilderness is best understood as nature which is up to something, at the holistic, 
ecosystem level.  It is land characterized by the unrestrained flourishing of natural 
purpose.  This natural purpose is grounded in the adaptation of organisms, and thus 
(apart from our own adaptations, our own natural purposes) makes no reference to 
human needs or vulnerabilities.  Wilderness is not so much hostile or benevolent as 
indifferent to human culture.  But human culture cannot be indifferent to it.  No matter 
how grand our institutions and industries become, a human culture only flourishes to the 
extent that it finds a sustainable niche in its greater ecosystem.  If we run roughshod over 
nature’s purposes and care not for the integrity of the land, then we seed our own 
destruction as well as the land’s.   
 Having understood wilderness in terms of the flourishing of natural purposes, the 
possibility emerges of working in cooperation with nature, or even on her behalf.  The 
practices of wilderness management and ecological restoration, which were oxymorons 
under the negative conception of wilderness as the absence of culture, become fires of 
hope for the possibility of healing the land and establishing a healthy human place 
within it. 
 6 
CHAPTER II 
APPRECIATION AND ANTIPATHY 
 
We did not think of the great open plains, the beautiful rolling hills, and winding 
streams with tangled growth, as ‘wild.’  Only to the white man was nature a 
‘wilderness’ and only to him was the land ‘infested’ with ‘wild’ animals and 
‘savage’ people.  To us it was tame. 
Chief Luther Standing Bear4 
 
 Wilderness has its being in history.  It has a history as a word, as a concept and 
as an entity.  Each of these histories is important in its own right.  As an entity, 
wilderness has gone through a gradual process of reduction and eradication, from once 
encompassing the whole of the earth to its current state—extensive still in the harshest 
regions—the arctic, desert and Himalayan—but in the temperate regions mostly 
represented by a relatively few legally designated pockets. Tropical wilderness is still 
large but rapidly being burned and cleared for agriculture.  This change has played out 
dramatically in North America as the demise of the frontier.  (Whether the other side of 
the frontier was legitimately a wilderness, given that it was peopled, is an issue for later.)  
The history of the word wilderness is a particularly Anglo story about etymology and 
usage.  It begins with the vague origins of wild in Teutonic or even earlier and includes 
many branches of metaphorical use, from describing a politician’s time out of office to 
designating the world this side of heaven.  The history of the concept of wilderness 
includes not only the English usage but the significance of its cognates in other 
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languages and across broader cultural heritages.  Especially interesting here is the 
evolution of the moral and aesthetic connotations of wilderness. 
 Roderick Nash, in his widely read work Wilderness and the American Mind, 
traces the development of wilderness as an idea, from its roots in prehistory to the 
current battles for its preservation.  As he tells it, wilderness began “as the unrecognized 
and unnamed environmental norm for most of earth’s history, created as a concept by 
civilization, thereafter widely hated and feared, and quite recently and remarkably, 
appreciated.”5  To motivate this account, he considers much in the Old English and 
Teutonic writings and mythologies to the effect that wilderness is dangerous and evil, a 
howling wasteland of no positive value, and continues on with a similar interpretation of 
wilderness in the Judeo-Christian scriptures and in their influence on Western culture.  
While the recent turning to wilderness as something precious, sacred and in need of 
protection is indeed remarkable, there was no such homogenously damning opinion of 
wilderness throughout all prior history.  Nor need we think that there was such a 
uniformity of condemnation in order to appreciate the radical nature of our current love 
affair.  Part of my purpose here is to challenge this interpretation of the Anglophone and 
Judeo-Christian heritage.  I am not the first to push Nash on this point.6 
 This is not to say that there was never a widely held opinion of wilderness as 
howling wasteland, fit only to be conquered.  There was, and the turn to wilderness 
appreciation is substantially in reaction to it and its material effects.  But this position 
was itself a local historical development, not a universal baseline.  It is a perspective 
                                                 
5
 Nash, Mind, 379. 
6
 Cf. Chipeniuk, “Origins of ‘Wilderness’,” Environments 21(1991):22-28. 
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found occasionally, alongside other more positive views, in many times and places, but 
it reaches a high point in the enlightenment and the reformation.  If there had really been 
a nearly universal deploring of wilderness from prehistory until Henry David Thoreau, 
the exuberance of our modern affection for it would be more than radical; it would be 
completely incomprehensible.  Rather I suggest that there is in wilderness much to love, 
much to fear and some that is lovely in its very fearsomeness.  People in all times and 
places have responded to wilderness with both appreciation and apprehension.  I offer, in 
other words, that our present love for wilderness is natural and understandable and that 
this is not undermined by evidence of wilderness having often been regarded with fear.   
 The history of the word wilderness begins something like this: 
wilde (Comm Teut) + déor (Comm Teut) => wil(d)déor (Old English) 
wil(d)déor + en (Teut) => wilddéoren (Old English) 
wilddéoren + nes (Old English) => wild(d)éornes (Old English) 
Etymologically this comes down to the quality of being made of wild animals. Wilde, 
later wild, is present in Common Teutonic and the first uses listed in the Oxford English 
Dictionary are describing animals “in a state of nature” as opposed to tame or 
domesticated.7   Déor, the root of deer, means beast in Old English, applied usually to 
quadrupeds but sometimes to animals more generally.  The modern restriction to a group 
of ruminant quadrupeds is a later development in Middle English, happening after the 
coinage of wilderness.  The suffix –en, “pertaining to, of the nature of,” was used in 
Teutonic “chiefly [to] indicate the material of which a thing is composed,” as in golden, 
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woolen, and wooden.8  Thus we get the now obsolete adjective wildern, meaning “wild, 
savage, desert,” but literally, “consisting of wild animals.”  To this is joined the suffix –
ness in an unusually concrete sense to form wilderness. Words formed with –ness 
usually signify an abstraction, “a state or condition” of some other concrete object.9  But 
wilderness signifies a concrete entity directly, a place. 
 The centrality of wild animals to the etymology is curious.  The modern 
definitions of wilderness make little reference to the animal inhabitants.  Perhaps the 
emphasis on beasts is because it is the beasts which most threaten us, making the land 
hostile.  When the wolves and the bears flourish, the domestic cows and sheep are in 
danger, and people do not walk alone at night.  Perhaps it is also because wild beasts are 
most easily displaced by human activity and presence, thus they signify places of 
solitude; the wildest animals seek out where people are not.  Aldo Leopold calls the 
crane “wildness incarnate” because of its love of solitude.10  The suffix –en, though now 
indistinguishable in the modern spelling, suggests that the wild beast is the very 
substance from which wilderness is formed.  In another article Nash draws out this 
connection to animals very well, interpreting the etymology as “the place of wild 
beasts.”11   “If wildlife is removed,” he writes, “although everything else remains visibly 
the same, the intensity of the sense of wilderness is diminished.”12   He cites Thoreau’s 
delight in the New England Lynx, Theodore Roosevelt’s equivocating wilderness with 
big game ranges and Leopold’s discussion of the last Grizzly on Escudilla.  Leopold is 
                                                 
8
 OED. 
9
 OED. 
10
 Leopold, Sand County Almanac, 101. 
11
 Nash, “Wild-dēor-ness,” 34. 
12
 Nash, “Wild-dēor-ness,” 35. 
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especially interesting in this regard, as he often describes particular species as defining 
the character of particular wild places.   
 The history of wild must be explored, if this etymology is to be reasonably 
complete.  Our clues to this word’s deep roots are vague, difficult and “complicated by 
uncertainty as to its primary meaning.”13  One suggestion is that it relates to the Old 
English wold, via Old Teutonic wal us, meaning forest.  The wilderness familiar to 
speakers of Old English would have been primarily forest, a connotation only later 
shaken by its use to describe Near Eastern deserts in English translations of the Bible.14   
But it is more probable that Old Teutonic *wil ijaz represents a pre-Teutonic 
*ghweltijos, the root of which is found in Welsh gwyllt, Irish geilt wild, and may 
have a parallel form in ghw r-, the base of Latin ferus, Greek , Lith. zvèrìs, 
[and] Old Slavic zv r  wild beast.”15   
Hence we are brought back again to the beast.  The primary definition of wild given in 
the OED is as follows: “Of an animal: Living in a state of nature; not tame, not 
domesticated: opp. to TAME a. 1.”  The earliest uses of wild are in this sense and 
analogously of plants.  Later it is applied to regions, and then to people, in senses 
derivative from this.  The key to understanding wildness, then, is rooted in the animal 
which bears it.   
 I should share the poet Gary Snyder’s limning of the etymology of wild, for he 
gives the diagnosis well: 
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 OED. 
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 Nash, Mind, 3. 
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 OED. 
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The word wild is like a Gray Fox trotting through the forest, ducking 
behind bushes, going in and out of sight.  Up close, first glance, it is 
“wild”—then farther into the woods next glance it’s “wyld” and it recedes 
via Old Norse villr and Old Teutonic wilthijaz into faint pre-Teutonic 
ghweltijos which means, still, wild and maybe wooded (wald) and lurks 
back there with possible connections to will, to Latin silva (forest, 
sauvage), and to the Indo-European root ghwer, base of Latin ferus (feral, 
fierce), which swings us back around to Thoreau’s “awful ferity” shared 
by virtuous people and lovers.16  
 Thoreau records in a journal the claim of one etymologist, that “ ‘Wild’ is the 
participle past of ‘to-will.’”17  While this is not terribly accurate, it does suggest a 
philosophical insight and may be useful for properly understanding what Thoreau says 
about wildness.  Will, with the meaning of desire or intention, comes rather from Old 
English willian, with no clear relation to wilde.  The past participle of will sometimes 
takes the form wild, but that is not the source of the animal sense of wild.  Similarly, an 
adjective will did form from wild, but meaning “going astray.”18  A connection in the 
ideas of will and wild is not far to find, though.  The strong-willed child is difficult to 
tame, and so is in a sense wild.  The more my thoughts and actions are a deliberate 
choice and activity of my own will rather than the inheritance of custom and society, the 
more willed, the more wild, I am. 
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 Snyder, “The Etiquette of Freedom,” 171. 
17
 Thoreau, Journal, V, 530.  The source is Trench’s On the Study of Words. 
18
 OED. 
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 Interestingly, Nash agrees with Thoreau’s journal, tracing wild back to will.19  
Following this line, he finds the description of animals as wild to be derived by analogy 
from wild as a description of people.  The etymology I have defended is just the 
opposite.  Wild is first about animals in their state of nature.  Descriptions of people as 
wild and other uses of the word are derived by analogy. 
 Moving back to wilderness, we find a range of definitions and many 
metaphorical uses.  The original, and still primary, notion evoked “is that of a forest 
primeval.”20  An early and culturally significant use of wilderness was in the first 
English translations of the scriptures where it designated the very arid regions of the 
Near East, where the Israelites wandered for 40 years and where Jesus fasted and was 
tempted by Satan.  This image of wilderness as desert became a strong secondary 
connotation. 
Through this Biblical usage the concept of a treeless wasteland became so 
closely associated with wilderness that Samuel Johnson defined it in 1755 in his 
Dictionary of the English Language as “a desert; a tract of solitude and 
savageness.” Johnson’s definition remained standard for many years in America 
as well as England.21 
The OED offers more usual, contemporary and less poetic definitions of wilderness as: 
“Wild or uncultivated land… A wild or uncultivated region or tract of land, uninhabited, 
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 Nash, Mind, 1. 
20
 Nash, Mind, 2. 
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 Nash, Mind, 3. 
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or inhabited only by wild animals.”  Desert is contrasted to wilderness as a place not 
only uninhabited but uninhabitable. 
 Metaphorical uses of wilderness have been ubiquitous.  Many of them, and the 
earliest, are religious in nature, comparing, for instance, the world this side of heaven to 
the time of trial and temptation undergone by Israel before entering the promised land.  
Other uninhabited places were soon described as wildernesses.  William Shakespeare 
first referred to a “wildernesse of Sea.”22  A particularly odd use, by modern sensibility, 
was to describe a certain kind of garden, or section of a garden, especially when 
arranged as a labyrinth.   The metaphorical uses ultimately come full circle from the 
literal, describing even urban places, when they are found inhospitable or unruly.  
Rudyard Kipling calls London a “packed wilderness” in this sense.23  
 In considering the definitions of wilderness, I have begun already to explore the 
history of the idea of wilderness.  The significance of wilderness in the Judeo-Christian 
heritage is an especially important source for understanding the place wilderness will 
come to inhabit in American thought and experience.  The Puritans especially looked at 
the American wilderness through the spectacles of scripture, seeing themselves as 
reliving in many ways the calling of Israel.  But the influence of the Christian heritage 
on American thought and practice also extends far beyond the Puritans and those 
deliberately living its metaphors. 
 Nash gives an extended reading of the Judeo-Christian interpretation of 
wilderness, ultimately concluding that “there was no fondness in the Hebraic tradition 
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 Tit. A. III. i. 94, cited in OED. 
23
 Kipling, Rudyard, Light that Failed, cited in OED. 
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for wilderness itself.”24  Wilderness stands in contrast to garden and to paradise.  Being 
sent into the wilderness was a punishment, not a reward.  Even in its frequent role as a 
refuge for the oppressed, it is the very hostility of the land that enables it to protect.  
Both Jewish and Christian folklore treated wilderness as the abode of demons and 
monsters.  In contrast, the blessings of God are manifested in the sending of water to 
turn the desert into garden. 
 This reading, however, is misleadingly one-sided.  That people in arid country 
value water, and that the desert is hard to live in, do not together entail that the Israelites 
were “a people so fearful of the desert.”25  But it does mean that if they did value 
wilderness, it was not for its material comforts.  Looking to the scriptures we find a 
number of ways in which wilderness is valued.26  
 First off, the scriptures open with repeated divine proclamations as to the 
goodness of the world.  Six times God declares His creation to be good before He even 
mentions making people.27  This goodness of the natural world as directly pleasing or 
glorifying to God is reaffirmed in the Psalms, among other places.28  A surprising 
number of passages show wilderness to be good for and because of the animals that 
dwell therein, as instance Psalm 104:18: “The high mountains are for the wild goats; 
the rocks are a refuge for the rock badgers.”  God even enters into covenant relationship 
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 Nash, Mind, 14. 
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 There are many recent works by environmentally minded theologians and church historians cataloging 
and exploring the record of nature appreciation in scripture and subsequent Christian thought.  I offer here 
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27
 Gen 1:4,10, 12, 18, 21, 25. 
28
 For clear examples see Ps 104 and 108. 
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explicitly with the animals.29  And famously, not one sparrow falls to the ground apart 
from Him.30 
 Wilderness is also valued in several ways for its benefit to humanity.  Notably 
among these, it is appreciated for its possibilities of solitude and retreat.  Tied to this is 
the recurring theme that wilderness is a place the individual can go to meet with God.  
Jacob, Moses, Elijah and Jesus are among those who sought or encountered God in 
wilderness retreat.  Wilderness and wild animals are also valued as pedagogical, 
speaking to us of God and virtue.  Consider here God’s response to Job, wherein God 
justifies and exalts himself before the accusing Job by declaring the splendor and 
mystery of his creation.31  The greater portion of this response is given over to detailed 
considerations of the glories of several animals, mostly wild.  
 That wilderness is sometimes the means of punishment and curse does not imply 
that it is intrinsically a bad thing.  When Zephaniah prophecies that God will to turn 
Nineveh into a desert, a haunt for hedgehogs and owls,32 it is not the presence of 
wilderness or these particular animals that is feared but the implied destruction of the 
city.  Even a deep aesthetic and spiritual appreciation of the wilderness is no substitute 
for having an abode. 
 So in the scriptural tradition, we find not only possibilities for understanding 
wilderness as a sign of cursedness, as that which could be made or could have been a 
garden or city, but also a nuanced array of possibilities for appreciation.  The subsequent 
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 Gen 9:12. 
30
 Matt 10:29. 
31
 Job 38-42. 
32
 Zeph 2:13-14. 
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history of Christian thought in the west bears each of these aspects in turn.  Strands of 
wilderness and nature appreciation run through the monastic movements, especially the 
desert fathers, St. Basil, St. Francis of Assisi, and the Celtic church.  While not 
addressing wilderness per se, consider the biocentric outlook revealed in St. Basil’s 
prayer: 
Oh, God, enlarge within us the sense of fellowship with all living things, our 
brothers the animals to whom Thou gavest the earth in common with us. We 
remember with shame that in the past we have exercised the high dominion of 
man with ruthless cruelty so that the voice of the earth, which should have gone 
up to thee in song, has been a groan of travail.33  
 Another strand of Christian thought however, notably informed by neo-
Platonism, rejected the whole of the material world, wild and civil together, looking 
rather inward to the soul and ahead to heaven as the only objects of worth.  This 
viewpoint achieved an unfortunate dominance in the middle ages.  Nash presents an 
intriguing anecdote of this mode of thought in Petrarch and Augustine.  It bears 
recounting in full. 
Petrarch’s 1336 ascent of Mount Ventoux provides an example.  He initially had 
no other purpose in climbing than experiencing some of the “delight” he found in 
wandering “free and alone, among the mountains, forests, and streams.”  After an 
all-day effort, Petrarch and his brother gained the summit.  “The great sweep of 
the view spread out before me,” Petrarch wrote to a friend, and “I stood like one 
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 quoted in Scully, Dominion, 13. 
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dazed.”  Clouds floated beneath his feet, and on the horizon he could see the 
snow-covered Alps.  Had he descended from the mountain at this point Petrarch 
might have retained an undiminished sense of enjoyment in the view, but it 
occurred to him to look at the copy of Saint Augustine’s Confessions he was 
accustomed to carry.  By chance he opened to the passage that admonished men 
not to take joy in mountains or scenery but rather to look after their salvation.  
Petrarch responded as a Christian: “I was abashed, and … I closed the book, 
angry with myself that should still be admiring earthly things who might long 
ago have learned … that nothing is wonderful but the soul.”  After this he 
hurriedly left the peak, “turned my inward eye upon myself,” and returned to his 
inn, muttering imprecations at the way the world’s beauty diverted men from 
their proper concerns.34  
Here indeed is a remarkable and lamentable condemnation of wilderness.  Note that both 
Augustine and Petrarch find such mountain wilderness to be pleasant and beautiful, and 
that this is the problem with it.  Some even celebrate this event as the first recorded 
instance of someone climbing a mountain “for its own sake, and to enjoy the view.”35  
Far from finding it to be howling and desolate, they complain that the temptation of this 
lesser good distracts people from tending to the greater good, salvation.  Consider also 
that this position condemns not only wilderness but all earthly pleasure and worldly 
endeavor.  Pastoral and urban landscapes fair no better than wilderness, for Augustine. 
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 Another, less religious, sort of antipathy to wild nature had its beginnings in the 
enlightenment and reformation in Europe.  Many environmental writers today, horrified 
by the legacy of the scientific and industrial revolutions, look back at Francis Bacon, 
René Descartes and Isaac Newton as an “unholy trinity.”36  Beginning at least with 
Galileo, enlightenment scientists and philosophers began dividing the world into primary 
and secondary qualities. 37  The primary qualities were those amenable to mathematical 
treatment—size, shape, weight, position, velocity—and thus appropriate to a scientific 
analysis.  Contrasted with these are the secondary, subjective qualities of appearance—
color, taste, odor, feel—which were discounted in importance.  Nature on this view was 
mechanism, clockwork.  The organic nature of life was reduced to complexity of 
arrangement, and mystery was reduced to puzzle.  Bacon preached tirelessly that the 
scientific approach could solve these puzzles, giving man power over nature, making 
good on the original promise of dominion.  Nature could be hospitable, the servant of 
culture; the Fall could be reversed through science. 
 Johannes Kepler urged the mechanical understanding of the stars and planets: 
“My aim is to show that the celestial machine is to be likened not to a divine organism 
but rather to a clockwork.”38  Descartes took it much further and closer to home; having 
thoroughly separated the soul and mind of mankind from any foundation in the body, he 
turned this mechanistic view of nature onto individual animals.  Confident to the point of 
certainty that animals had no subjective experience, Descartes and his followers 
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conducted anatomical investigation on living animals with neither anesthetic nor guilt.  
Peter Coates, in dry understatement, writes that “The ramifications of Cartesian dualism 
are generally thought to have been gravest where animals are concerned.”39  And Max 
Oelschlaeger notes that this mechanization of animals constitutes Descartes’ “most 
important effect on the idea of wilderness,” which is after all, the place of wild beasts.40 
 This mechanistic view of nature built on the trend of Renaissance humanism to 
find all value and significance in human experience and culture.  If nature is merely a 
clock, a machine, then its value can only lie in the services and products it can produce 
for humanity.  John Locke turned this mechanistic view of nature into a political and 
economic view that many consider to be the philosophical foundation of the Constitution 
of the United States.  Nature, according to Locke, obtained value when it was mixed 
with human labor and thus became property.  Protecting the laborer’s right to this 
property is a, if not the, primary purpose of government.41  Wilderness, as nature not yet 
transformed by human labor, is nothing but waste for Locke. 
 Adam Smith, father of free market economics, made this view operative, 
bringing the primary/secondary quality distinction from science to politics, privileging 
whatever could be quantified monetarily and thus treated mathematically.42  It is the 
accrual of wealth, Smith tells us, that brings nations out of savagery.  Nations and 
individuals, not only may, but ought to pursue their self interest by making as much 
wealth as they are able.  Transforming the waste of wilderness into economic capital 
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through human labor became, after Smith, a high calling, the very substance of human 
progress.  “With the publication of Smith’s Wealth of Nations,” writes Oelschlaeger, 
“the line between civilization and the wilderness was clearly drawn.”43  
 The legacy of these enlightenment thinkers still forms the core of the dominant 
Western approach to nature: 
Modernism, that combination of the power of science and technology with 
political and economic ideologies modeled on the machine metaphor, rules the 
world.  Practically everyone, save a few ecologists and kindred spirits, thinks of 
wild nature as scientific nature, and the wilderness itself has become a mere 
landscape.44 
 The colonists’ experience with the American wilderness was interpreted through 
these old world categories.  When initial hopes of paradise—of abundant gold and 
fountains of youth—were deflated, sentiments quickly turned to fear, loathing and 
conquest.  “When William Bradford stepped off the Mayflower into a ‘hideous and 
desolate wilderness’ he started a tradition of repugnance.”45  Paradise might yet be had, 
but only through the conquest and subjection of nature, by delivering it from its 
wilderness condition.   
 The Puritans, especially, approached American wilderness through a strongly 
biblical metaphor, deliberately reliving the wilderness experience of Israel.  Particularly, 
they wanted to be the new city on the hill, demonstrating to the world to possibility and 
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desirability of a reformed Christian polity.  In their original intention, the Puritans saw 
the American wilderness as a void, a place where they could set up their society from 
scratch.  They needed a place free of bishops and heretics in which to build their New 
Jerusalem.  They did not intend to stay there, but having demonstrated the viability of 
such a society and government to an attentive England and Europe, they would carry 
their model back across the Atlantic.  Having been remaindered and abandoned in 
America, subsequent generations struggled to reconstruct the meaning of their “errand 
into the wilderness.”46  
 Wilderness, the puritans found, was both physically and morally dangerous.  The 
political void they sought offered too much temptation to license, and they had great 
difficulty sustaining themselves in it.  In their successful transformation of the 
wilderness to garden, God’s hand of blessing was revealed.  In the hardship and severity 
of the land was seen His wrath.   America, like Canaan, was thought of as a Pagan 
stronghold which had to be taken by conquest.  “Cotton Mather believed he knew how it 
got into this condition: Satan had seduced the first inhabitants for the purpose of making 
a stronghold.  From this perspective, the natives were not merely heathens but active 
disciples of the devil.”47 
 Though somewhat later, the writings of Nathaniel Hawthorne illustrate the link in 
Puritan thought between wilderness and evil.  Consider what “Young Goodman Brown” 
found going on in the wilderness.  There, “on a dreary road, darkened by the gloomiest 
trees of the forest,” he met the devil, who showed him all the town folk, including the 
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minister, meeting in secret for witchcraft and satanic worship.48  In The Scarlet Letter, 
Hester Prynne first sins in the wilderness.  And “the illegitimate Pearl, ‘imp of evil, 
emblem and product of sin’ is the only character at home in the wilderness.”49  
 As the pioneer pressed the frontier westward, the biblical metaphor lessened as 
the material gospel of progress and manifest destiny took hold.  “Although there were a 
few exceptions,” writes Nash, “American frontiersmen rarely judged wilderness with 
criteria other than the utilitarian or spoke of their relation to it in other than a military 
metaphor.”50  Alexis de Tocqueville tangled with this attitude in his famous trip to 
America:  
in Europe people talk a great deal of the wilds of America, but the Americans 
themselves never think about them; they are insensible to the wonders of 
inanimate nature and they may be said not to perceive the mighty forests that 
surround them till they fall beneath the hatchet.  Their eyes are fixed upon 
another sight, the … march across these wilds, draining swamps, turning the 
course of rivers, peopling solitudes, and subduing nature.51  
The frontiersmen, who were closest to wilderness and actively engaged in transforming 
and cultivating it, generally evidenced very little appreciation for it as wilderness.  They 
engaged the wilds as an opponent, as a chaos and a waste to which they gave order and 
purpose.  There were exceptions, pioneers who evinced a positive sensibility about the 
wild landscapes they entered, and some unknown number abandoned their pioneering 
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project, finding new society among the American natives.  But for most part, the 
frontiersmen marched under the banner of progress hoisted by Locke and Smith. 
 As the frontier began to break up, as the pioneers’ domination of it drew near 
completion, there was a remarkable turning in American thought.  With influence from 
the European romantics, members of the literate and urban class in the east began to 
value wilderness for many of the same reasons it was formerly denigrated.  To 
understand this, we must consider at least briefly what the European romantics were up 
to. 
 The late enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant tore a rift in the building and 
dominant scientific perspective, in large part by undercutting the privileged status of 
primary qualities.  The quantifiable aspects of experience, that is its spatio-temporal 
arrangements, are a mock up, a product of the active and constructive nature of cognitive 
experience.  The primary qualities do not constitute a direct grasp of objective reality but 
are as much in the domain of subjective experience as the more affective, secondary 
qualities.  Kant then worked to legitimate the significance of aesthetic judgments, 
allowing an interpretation of nature as poetic as well as scientific.  “Accordingly, 
[Kant’s] third critique opens the door to Romanticism generally, and Coleridge, 
Wordsworth, and Shelley in particular.”52  
 The Romantic poets threw themselves into a new aesthetic relation to wild 
nature, writing both of nature’s beauty and of the profundity of their experiences of it.  
They were intoxicated by the very aspects of nature which Locke and company had 
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written off as insignificant in both being and consequence—the subjective and affective 
qualities of its experience.  Nature did not sit idly on the material side of the Cartesian 
mind/body dualism but claimed affinity and kinship to the spirit and mind of the poet.  
Nature pulsed with moral and spiritual energy.  Depending on the poet, it was either the 
surest path to God or the Divine principle itself.  A selection from Wordsworth’s The 
Prelude (1805) illustrates the spirit of this turn: 
I held unconscious intercourse with beauty 
Old as creation, drinking in a pure 
Organic pleasure from the silver wreaths 
Of curling mist, or from the level plain 
Of waters coloured by impending clouds 
 . . . . . . . 
To every natural form, rock, fruit, or flower, 
Even the loose stones that cover the highway, 
I gave a moral life: I saw them feel, 
Or linked them to some feeling; the great mass 
Lay bedded in a quickening soul, and all 
That I beheld respired with inward meaning.53 
 Related to the Romantic turn was the rise of primitivism.  Disenchanted with the 
broken promise of the industrial revolution to save humanity from a wretched state of 
nature, writers like Michel de Montaigne and Jean-Jacques Rousseau looked rather to 
                                                 
53
 Quoted in Coates, Nature, 126. 
 25 
nature to save humanity from a wretched state of industrialization, introducing the 
enduring, if problematic, notion of the noble savage.54  Such primitivist ideas about the 
corrupting influence of civilization and the restoring powers of wild nature continue to 
characterize much environmental discourse to the present.  
 Ralph Waldo Emerson gave an original, distinctively American, interpretation of 
Romanticism in his book Nature (1836).  Evaluations of Emerson with regard to the 
history of environmental thought are mixed.  He exhilarates in the beauty of nature, like 
Wordsworth finding an affinity to consciousness in it: “… all natural objects make a 
kindred impression, when the mind is open to their influence;” and “The greatest delight 
which the fields and woods minister, is the suggestion of an occult relation between man 
and the vegetable.”55  The lover of nature, the uncommon one who still has childlike 
eyes to see, belongs to nature, and she ministers to him: “Nature says,—he is my 
creature, and maugre all his impertinent griefs, he shall be glad with me.”56  But it is 
clear that, to Emerson, nature is secondary and subservient in value to human 
spirituality.  Do not indulge too much in these nature revelings, but turn back to the care 
of your soul, he says: “beauty in nature is not ultimate.  It is the herald of inward and 
eternal beauty, and is not alone a solid and satisfactory good.”57  Nature still exists for 
humanity, who will eventually realize its dominion over nature, at which time 
“disagreeable appearances,” such as spiders and snakes, will be seen no more.58 
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 Henry David Thoreau was early on a disciple and companion of Emerson, and 
Emerson left a significant deposit in Thoreau’s thinking. 
His mentor’s key contribution was helping Thoreau to establish a belief that 
nature can be known through the immediate activity of inquiring consciousness 
(or, alternatively, an absolute separation between consciousness and nature does 
not exist).  This transcendental axiom, or first principle, was the heart of the 
Emersonian philosophical legacy.59 
It is Thoreau, however, who is unquestionably the first major luminary in the American 
wilderness tradition.  "It is no exaggeration," Oelschlaeger writes, "to say that today all 
thought of the wilderness flows in Walden's wake."60  His essay “Walking,” perpetually 
revised till the end of his life, is equally important in this regard.   
 Thoreau had several significant influences besides Emerson.  He read everything 
he could get his hands on regarding Eastern thought and spirituality, setting an enduring 
precedent for American environmentalists.61  The Prussian explorer and scientist 
Alexander von Humboldt, to be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, was another 
great influence.  Thoreau may even have modeled some portions of his life after him.62  
Even so, there is no reducing Thoreau to his influences.   
 The first and longest chapter of Walden is titled “Economy” and is a devastating 
critique of Adam Smith.  The companionship of wild nature is far more enriching than 
material wealth, offers Thoreau.  We are better off in fact, the less we are encumbered by 
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the latter.  A relatively small amount of cultivation can supply all the material comfort 
we really need.  Neither has Thoreau any patience for the Cartesian version of 
knowledge as certain and objective: “The highest we can attain is not Knowledge, but 
Sympathy with Intelligence.”63 
 A fundamental theme in Thoreau’s writing is that nature exists for its own 
purposes, and is wonderful therein.  This is no mere assumption, but the deliverance of 
his sympathetic inquiry into nature.  A representative passage from “Chesuncook” in The 
Maine Woods is described by Oelschlaeger as the clearest and earliest “statement of the 
preservationist's credo:”64 
the pine is no more lumber than man is, and to be made into boards and houses is 
no more its true and highest use than the truest use of man is to be cut down and 
made into manure. . . . Every creature is better alive than dead, men and moose 
and pine-trees, and he who understands it aright will rather preserve its life than 
destroy it.65 
Thoreau’s reflections on his bean patch in Walden follow a similar tack, finding that 
nature exists as much for the other animals as for humanity: “These beans have results 
which are not harvested by me.  Do they not grow for woodchucks partly? … Shall I not 
rejoice also at the abundance of weeds whose seeds are the granary of the birds?”66  
Indeed Thoreau is perpetually eager to point out what a small and modest portion of 
nature belongs to humanity:   
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The farmers and their works are scarcely more obvious than woodchucks and 
their burrows.  Man and his affairs, church and state and school, trade and 
commerce, and manufactures and agriculture, even politics, the most alarming of 
them all,—I am pleased to see how little space they occupy in the landscape.67  
 Wilderness, for Thoreau, stands in an entirely different relation to culture than 
Locke described.  Wilderness is not waste, waiting to be brought into the sphere of 
culture as property, lumber for instance, but is the mother and nurse of culture.  Thoreau 
finds great significance in the story of Romulus and Remus being suckled by a wolf.  
This is the context of the frequently cited line, “in Wildness is the preservation of the 
World.”68  If culture does not regularly return to nature, to drink her inspiration afresh, it 
stagnates and degrades. Wildness is the principle of life and the root of goodness.  As 
with culture, so with the individual; Thoreau offered an ethic of balancing civilizing 
influence with an inner wildness: “I would not have every man nor every part of man 
cultivated, any more than I would have every acre of earth cultivated: part will be tillage, 
but the greater part will be meadow and forest …”69 
 Thoreau embraced the romantic dictum to inquire openly of nature, and it led 
him on a walk into the wilderness—and he spent a large part of his life so walking. 
Thoreau’s idea of wilderness is rooted in a lifetime of primary experiences or 
firsthand meetings with nature.  Not only did he live in the wilderness alongside 
Walden Pond for more than two years, but he ranged widely and frequently over 
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New England and journeyed on occasion to Canada and Minnesota.  Thoreau 
climbed mountains, explored the vast, densely forested regions of Maine, and 
floated rivers.  And he walked—day-hiked, in the popular idiom—almost every 
day of his life.70 
He came back with a new view of nature.  (An American original relation to the 
universe?)  Nature is not the knowable, quantifiable atoms-in-the-void of science.  
Indeed, “Nature is a personality so vast and universal that we have never seen one of her 
features.”71 Nor is nature a contemplative ladder, whose end is to lead us to the eternal 
beauty beyond her.  No, says Thoreau, only with metaphor can I show you: “Here is this 
vast, savage, howling mother of ours, Nature, lying all around, with such beauty, and 
such affection for her children, as the leopard.”72 
 John Muir, the second giant of American wilderness thought, was a close student 
of Emerson and Thoreau.  When Muir took to the mountains, a copy of Emerson’s 
essays went in the pack.73 For Muir, as for Emerson, nature leads the soul to God: “The 
clearest way into the universe is through a forest wilderness.”74  But nature’s own 
purposes are not subservient to this; rather following Thoreau, “all wildness is finer than 
tameness,” and the creatures, even rattlesnakes, are their own good, exist for their own 
sake, “and we need not begrudge them their share of life.”75  Indeed it is not uncommon 
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for Muir to nearly plagiarize Thoreau: for instance, “in God’s wildness lies the hope of 
the world—the great fresh, unblighted, unredeemed wilderness.”76 
 But Muir was also the child of “activist Evangelical Christianity,” and its themes 
pervade his thought to the end.77  Muir was an evangelist on behalf of the wilderness.  
He compared himself to John the Baptist,78 and baptism was his metaphor for 
understanding the spiritual encounter of God in the wilderness.  “I care to live,” he 
writes, “only to entice people to look at Nature’s loveliness.”79  Wild nature was 
revelatory and healing for Muir, the direct, unfallen creation of God.  Only in the works 
of fallen man, namely civilization, was sin written into the landscape.  So Muir called to 
America to come and receive mountain baptism, and they came in great numbers. 
 “As a publicizer of the American wilderness Muir had no equal.”80  His writings 
were enormously popular, and everyone from the aging Emerson to the then sitting 
President Theodore Roosevelt went into the woods with him.  Muir also became the first 
great environmental activist, founding the Sierra Club and giving a great deal of impetus 
to the formation of the National Parks.  Indeed Muir was not an insignificant 
precipitating factor in the cult of wilderness devotion that swept the nation around the 
turn of the century, partly also a reaction to the official closing of the frontier.  He was 
also a significant beneficiary of this movement.  Nash writes that “it was Muir’s good 
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fortune to live at a time when he could reap the honors that belatedly came to Thoreau’s 
ideas.”81 
 Muir also saw the beginning of what became a major split in the environmental 
movement in his parting with Gifford Pinchot.  At first fast friends, they both loved the 
forest and hated to see the abuse it received through human use.  But ultimately, 
Pinchot’s forestry (he became the first Chief Forester of the US Forest Service) sought 
only a more efficient, sustained use of the forest, still subjecting all to the ends of 
humanity.  The final straw for Muir was when Pinchot approved the grazing of sheep in 
forest reserves—sheep were an arch-nemesis to Muir, the “hoofed locusts” that 
destroyed so much of the Sierras.82 Thus was born the preservationist/conservationist 
split. 
 In the end, Muir apparently gave his life to the cause of wilderness preservation.  
There was a sensational, nation-wide fight over the Hetch Hetchy valley, a particularly 
spectacular part of the newly formed Yosemite National Park.  Nearby San Francisco 
sought to and eventually succeeded in damming it for hydroelectric power.  Muir spent 
his last years in fervent opposition, growing increasingly fanatic and desperate in his 
rhetoric, describing those in favor of the dam as “temple destroyers” and worshipers of 
the “Almighty Dollar.”83  The city of San Francisco he dubbed “the Prince of the Powers 
of Darkness.”84  The dam was approved in 1913, and Muir died the next year.  But the 
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preservationist movement he helped inspire had been galvanized and given a solid 
education in political action. 
 Around the turn of the century, the history of wilderness thought in America 
explodes in breadth.  The 1890 census declared the official end of the frontier,85 and the 
general attitude of conquest seemingly turned to one of nostalgia overnight.  Fredrick 
Jackson Turner famously proposed in his 1893 essays, that wilderness was the defining 
influence on our national, political character. “Turner believed, in short, that democracy 
was a forest product.”86  Theodore Roosevelt, a significant wilderness popularizer in his 
right, saw this coming and worried about the loss of manly virtue that had risen from our 
frontier experience.  He organized the Boone and Crockett club in 1888 to encourage big 
game hunting.87  The Call of the Wild, by Jack London, was published in 1903, and 
Edgar Rice Burroughs’s Tarzan of the Apes first offered its depiction of wilderness 
virtues to great popularity in 1912. The Boy Scout Handbook would soon outsell every 
book but the Bible, ensuring that every boy could experience the frontier wilderness.88 
 Yet despite this explosion of breadth, there is one more intellectual giant in the 
wilderness heritage to be considered, one more founding visionary: Aldo Leopold.  
Leopold was trained in the Yale School of Forestry, an institutional legacy of the Pinchot 
family, and he essentially founded the science of game management.  Over his life, 
Leopold offered many defenses of wilderness preservation—first recreational, then 
scientific, and finally ethical—evidencing a shift away from Pinchot and toward Thoreau 
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and Muir.89  His greatest influence on American environmental thought is through his 
posthumously published book, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There 
(1949), now second in stature only to Walden among the classics of American nature 
writing.90  And the Sand County Almanac is replete with echoes of Thoreau’s ideas, 
though always transformed in Leopold’s distinctive voice. 
 Leopold was deeply influenced by the study of ecology, its focus on 
interconnection and process and its central metaphor of community.  Land, for Leopold, 
is a “biotic community,” incorporating “soils, waters, plants, and animals.”91  His central 
insight is twofold: (1) that this community, as a whole, can be in a state of health or of 
disease, and (2) that this implies a social ethic for those members of the community 
capable of following one, namely, the human animal. 
In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the 
land-community to plain member and citizen of it.  It implies respect for his 
fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such.92  
His frequently quoted summary of this ethic reads as follows: 
Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and esthetically right, as well 
as what is economically expedient.  A thing is right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.  It is wrong when it tends 
otherwise.93 
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 That the land has a health, a good of its own, is not something Leopold started 
with, but, like Thoreau’s realization that nature is not for us, was born out of a profound 
experience of the wilderness.  After working, studying and managing game in many 
forests, Leopold took a hunting trip to the Sierra Madre in Mexico.  “It was here that I 
first clearly realized that land is an organism, that all my life I had seen only sick land, 
whereas here was a biota still in perfect aboriginal health.”94  From then on, the heavily 
managed forests envisioned by the Pinchot school of resource extraction could only be 
seen as a travesty. 
 It is not that humanity can not live in healthy relation to the land, but that we 
have not known or tried to.  Wilderness must now be preserved not least for its scientific 
importance as an example of healthy land, against which damaged land might be 
compared.  Our previous attempts at land management have been short-cited and 
ignorant, as witnessed by the extent of predator removal accomplished before the 
importance of predators was realized.  To act intelligently in accordance with the land 
ethic requires a deep historic, relationally thick understanding of the land community 
and its functions; it requires, in Leopold’s words, “Thinking like a Mountain.”95 
 The last major stage in the history of wilderness preservation was the 
codification of its goals in the Wilderness Act of 1964.  This act had a tumultuous path 
to becoming law, undergoing many hearings, over six-thousand pages of testimony and 
sixty-six resubmissions.96  The number of wilderness proponents was great by this time, 
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but notable among the figures instrumental in seeing it through were Robert Marshall 
and Howard Zahniser, the Act’s primary author.  The Wilderness Act provided for the 
designation of wilderness areas based on a number of features, but it especially aimed at 
large roadless areas.  It formed the National Wilderness Preservation System which 
presently has authority over more than 700 wilderness areas encompassing over 107 
million acres.97  The Act gives a functional definition of wilderness: 
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own works 
dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth and its 
community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who 
does not remain.  An area of wilderness is further defined to mean in this Act an 
area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, 
without permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and 
managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and which (1) generally appears 
to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man’s 
work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or 
a primitive and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres 
of land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in 
an unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological, or 
other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value.98  
 Yet despite this triumph, the legal and institutional establishment of wilderness 
preservation as a national priority, there has been a distinct trend in the environmental 
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movement in recent decades away from this once core and critical value.  Several 
intellectuals sympathetic to the environmental project over all, have offered harsh 
critiques of such a central focus on wilderness preservation.  Wilderness as a value 
seems to deny humanity a legitimate place in nature, leading to mistreatment especially 
of indigenous and tribal peoples.  The whole idea of the American frontier being a 
wilderness at all is claimed to involve a denial of real humanity to the original 
inhabitants.  Might not devotion to wilderness be a pathological escape mechanism, a 
way of avoiding responsibility for past atrocities and ongoing complicity in destructive 
and exploitative practices? 
 Ramachandra Guha is an early, and distinctively Third-World, voice in this 
critique.99  Guha’s complaint is that a radical version of the wilderness preservation 
movement, namely deep ecology, is taking over the environmental project, neglecting 
our most serious environmental problems.  This radical version of the environmentalism 
is characterized by an obsession with the biocentric/anthropocentric distinction and with 
the preservation and restoration of unspoilt nature.  This has been especially harmful, he 
thinks, in its exportation to the Third World.   
The two fundamental ecological problems facing the globe are (i) 
overconsumption by the industrial world and by urban elites in the Third World 
and (ii) growing militarization … Neither of these problems has any tangible 
connection to the anthropocentric-biocentric distinction. … If the above 
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dichotomy is irrelevant, the emphasis on wilderness is positively harmful when 
applied to the Third World. 100 
Non-American environmental movements, especially in India, have much more to do 
with the sustainable and equitable use of nature, than with leaving it alone.  As in the 
case of the famous Chipko, tree-hugging movement, environmental battles are usually 
fought by poor, rural, subsistence, sustainable users of nature against the wealthy, 
extractive, commercial-industrial users.  Wilderness preservation, as exported to India, 
tends to be rather a further repression of the poor, rural, historical users, instead of a 
help. 
Because India is a long settled and densely populated country in which agrarian 
populations have a finely balanced relationship with nature, the setting aside of 
wilderness areas has resulted in a direct transfer of resources from the poor to the 
rich. … The designation of tiger reserves was made possible only by the physical 
displacement of existing villages and their inhabitants… In no case have the 
needs of the local population been taken into account, and as in many parts of 
Africa, the designated wildlands are managed primarily for the benefit of rich 
tourists.101 
Wilderness preservation, in Guha’s estimation, is a relatively unimportant and 
impracticable part of the environmental program, which is possible in America only 
because of our sparse population and abundant wealth.  And worse than being 
                                                 
100
 Guha, “Radical American Environmentalism,” 234-35. 
101
 Guha, “Radical American Environmentalism,” 235.  That Guha may be merely dismissing the 
biocentric perspective is suggested by his comment regarding rich tourists.  Are the tiger reserves really 
managed for wealthy tourists, or for the oppressed and persecuted tigers, with some help from the tourist’s 
dollar? 
 38 
unimportant, its unintended consequences are terribly harmful in the Third World, where 
American-backed preservation serves to solidify the oppression of the poor by the 
wealthy, over-consuming urban class. 
 Jonathan Adams and Thomas McShane’s volume, The Myth of Wild Africa 
(1992), offers a related critique of the wilderness preservation in Africa.  Preservationists 
have consistently failed to recognize the native Africans as integral members of the 
biotic community, the ecosystem.  As a result, preservation strategies have followed a 
model of protecting areas by removing people, which has not kept the balance of the 
ecosystems and has been oppressive of many Africans.  A growing body of work in 
ecological anthropology is illuminating the depth of connection in many places between 
wild landscapes and local culture, causing many to wonder whether people might not 
belong in protected areas after all. 
 Two prominent American critics of the value of wilderness preservation argue 
that the very idea of wilderness is flawed: William Cronon’s “The Trouble with 
Wilderness, or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” and J. Baird Callicott’s “The 
Wilderness Idea Revisited: the Sustainable Development Alternative.”  The same theme 
may be found in other wilderness critics, but I take these as representative.  Wilderness, 
for Cronon and Callicott essentially means an absence, the privation of human influence 
or presence. 
 The philosophical upshot of wilderness, on Cronon’s reading, is “that nature, to 
be natural, must also be pristine—remote from humanity and untouched by our common 
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past.”102  Such a view of wilderness is essentially dualistic: wild nature versus civilized 
humanity.  The wilderness ideology, as Cronon sees it, claims that all goodness, value 
and worth is found on the wild side of this dichotomy.  This ideology grew in response 
to the pioneer perspective, which embraced the same dualism but put all value on the 
other side.  Wilderness, by this interpretation, is not just one way among many in which 
nature has value, but the only condition in which it has value.  The purported 
consequence of wilderness thinking, on which Cronon’s complaints are founded, is that 
it must be the absence of humanity that makes nature valuable. 
 Part of Cronon’s trouble with this version of wilderness is that it gives us no 
help; it can counsel only suicide.103  Most of our environmental problems are about 
getting along with nature in the places we do inhabit, but by the wilderness ideology, 
these places are already degraded and worthless anyway.  Cronon wants us to stop 
thinking in terms of wilderness in favor of a conception of nature and nature’s value 
which includes humanity and human-influenced landscapes. 
 Callicott, like Cronon, finds wilderness to be intolerably dualistic.104  “I … 
suggest,” he writes, “that the popular wilderness idea is as inherently flawed as its 
counterpart, the conventional development idea.”105  By focusing our environmental 
efforts on preserving nature from human influence, we have no purchase in reforming 
the character of human influence in the urban and rural places where it does and must 
hold sway.  Sustainable development is the middle way, for Callicott, the conception of 
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our place in nature which affirms both civilization and the wild in relation.  This critique, 
like Cronon’s, understands wilderness, and hence purported natural value, to consist in 
the absence of human influence. 
 Neither Callicott nor Cronon would do away with or even diminish the legal 
protections of designated wilderness areas.  These areas serve important roles, but they 
should not be held up as the standard for what all land ought to be.  They should not 
even be called wilderness areas but “biodiversity reserves.”106  The “necessity of 
managing (and hence artificializing?) wilderness areas in order for them to continue to 
play their vital part in biological conservation” is further evidence to Callicott that the 
wilderness idea is flawed.107 
 Wilderness, as a conservation value, is accused, in this recent wave of critical 
evaluation, of being: (1) misanthropic, denying humanity a genuine place in nature; (2) 
ahistorical,108 based on a denial of humanity or culture to the Native Americans who 
inhabited and changed the land; (3) a mistake, resulting from our inability to see the 
deep influence of indigenous humanity in the landscape; (4) derogatory of ‘impure’ 
nature, which has been influenced or transformed by human culture; (5) pathological, the 
product of guilt evasion and denial; (6) an obstacle to constructing a positive relation to 
nature, and thus reforming our extractive and consumptive practices, and (7) distracting 
from more important environmental issues, such as poverty and war.  This is an 
impressive and damning list of charges, which if warranted would justify abandoning the 
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wilderness preservation tradition as it now stands.  Under almost all of these lies the 
assumption that wilderness means land untouched by people. 
 The legal definitions of wilderness in the Wilderness Act unfortunately invite this 
interpretation of wilderness—that wilderness is essentially characterized by the absence 
of human influence on the landscape.  Wilderness is recognized, according to the Act, by 
the absence of “the imprint of man’s work” and “human habitation,” which are generally 
characterized as trammeling “the earth and its community of life.”  Note especially the 
phrase “where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.”  Land is not a wilderness 
if people are living in it, no matter how they are living.  If this kind of wilderness is held 
up as the purist form of nature, then people and their “works” are just contamination.  
But this same passage declares that such areas are to be “protected and managed” and 
elsewhere in the Act that wilderness areas “shall be administered for the use and 
enjoyment of the American people …”109   It is not only to be managed, but managed for 
our use.  The conflicting directions here seem to border on incoherence: how can we 
preserve land from human influence and presence for use and enjoyment by people? 
 It is my position in this dissertation that the American tradition of wilderness 
preservation means far more by “wilderness” than the mere absence of humanity, that it 
means instead something positive.  It is not the absence of people, but the integrity and 
flourishing of nature which is sought.  Understanding this allows for a reconception of 
wilderness that is both helpful to and contiguous with valuing nature in other conditions, 
and which requires no dualistic divorce of humanity from nature. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE NATURALISTS’ DEPOSIT 
 
The true man of science will know nature better by his finer organization; he will 
smell, taste, see, hear, feel, better than other men.  His will be a deeper and finer 
experience.  We do not learn by inference and deduction and the application of 
mathematics to philosophy, but by direct intercourse and sympathy. 
Henry David Thoreau110 
 Much is made of the indebtedness of the wilderness preservation movement to 
literary romanticism.  Rarely is its equally significant debt to the legacy of the natural 
historians and the frontier scientists mentioned, or how these two bequests relate.  
Indeed, the history of the naturalists is full of non-economic valuings of nature and 
ecological critiques of civilization.  All of the major figures in the wilderness 
preservation movement drank deeply from the naturalists’ science and most were 
capable practitioners in their own right.  Neither has the presence of the conservationist-
scientist lessened in the environmental movement today; rather it is the poet who seems 
to play second fiddle to the scientist.  An important upshot from this is that while the 
romantic poets may be criticized for having a scripted experience of nature, the 
naturalists deliberately engaged nature in an open inquiry.  Their conceptions of nature 
grew out of careful, attentive study.  It is less plausible to claim that they saw only what 
they wanted, as Nash says of the poets.111  Perhaps even more interesting are the several 
figures who were equally devoted to both roles, scientist and poet, and the struggles they 
had to marry such disparate projects. 
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 By naturalists, I mean those who set about to study, describe and catalogue the 
phenomena of the natural world, whether animal, plant or geological.  This role would 
later splinter into a thousand specialties, but “comprehensiveness was the chief 
intellectual characteristic of the naturalists.”112  They often called themselves botanists, 
and leaned that way, probably because much of the earliest work and training was tied to 
the medical schools, which had a very practical interest in the properties of plants.  But 
the naturalists showed a keen interest in all the phenomena of nature and, remarkably, 
were not at all constrained to merely practical studies.  
 “The naturalist’s period in America covered roughly the century and more from 
1725 to 1840 or 1850.”113 Of course, there have been naturalists, in this sense, as far 
back as Aristotle, and I would argue that today’s field ecologists equally qualify.  But 
during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, this way of doing science flourished.  
Eventually it gave way in large part to the professionalization and specialization of 
science, which also tended to bring people out of the field and into the laboratory.  In 
Europe, the naturalists’ period began earlier, underway well before 1725, motivated 
often by the project of physico-theology, or natural theology.  
 One consequence of the enlightenment was a robust interest in nature as a source 
of theology.  If nature was mechanical, then it was an extraordinarily intricate and well-
ordered machine.  Contemplation of these intricacies and efficiencies was considered to 
be a sound path to the knowledge of God, the supreme clock maker.  The study of nature 
was an exercise in piety, and the parson-naturalist was a regular figure.  John Ray’s The 
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Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation (1691) and William Paley’s 
Natural Theology (1802) are representative of this approach.  Add to this interest, the 
continual flow of novel reports and specimens of natural phenomena coming back from 
the new world and it is not hard to see how natural history became a preoccupation not 
only of the serious intellectual but also of European high society generally.  Indeed, “a 
king’s favor” could be “secured with a flying squirrel and other curiosities.”114  
 By the early eighteenth century, natural history had thus become a thriving 
cultural project.  Specimens were being collected all over the world, species being 
described, and extensive correspondence and books were flowing freely about them.  In 
cultural centers in the New World, especially Philadelphia, Charleston, New York and 
Boston, societies, journals and museums were founded, dedicated to the study of natural 
history.115   
 William Smallwood, in his thorough historical review, Natural History and the 
American Mind (1941), suggests the cultural importance of these early activities: 
 As we leave the consideration of the academies of natural science, we 
realize that America is under a great debt to these learned societies.  Their 
influence was larger than that of any one university, and perhaps of all the 
universities combined, for the reason that they were composed of adult men 
rather than of youth.  The persistent appeals of the members of the learned 
organizations promoted the taste for nature and an appreciation of natural 
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scenery.  With a more scientific development of natural history came a more 
intelligent understanding of the meaning of nature.116 
 John Bartram, a Pennsylvania Quaker and botanist, “carried on the most 
extensive correspondence with European students of nature.”117  Among these 
correspondents was Carlos Linnaeus, who described Bartram as “the greatest natural 
botanist of the age.”118  Bartram was a founding member, along with Benjamin Franklin, 
of the American Philosophical Society.  He also founded one of the earliest botanical 
gardens in America.119 
 But John Bartram’s greatest bequest to natural history and environmental thought 
may well have been his son, William Bartram, who became a botanist as well.   
The first American to devote his entire life to what we would now call the 
environment, [William] Bartram was the most significant nature writer before 
Thoreau and a nature artist who rivals Audobon.120 
Science was intimately tied to art in William Bartram, whose ability to draw beautiful 
sketches from nature earned him a reputation and a commission for a botanical 
expedition.121  In the space of four years, Bartram traveled five-thousand miles through 
the mostly unsettled regions of the Southeast.122  The literary fruit of this labor is his 
Travels through North and South Carolina, Georgia, East and West Florida (1791).  His 
powers of observation are evident, and his nuanced descriptions are communicated with 
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an elegance of prose which seems unhindered by his scientific terminology.  He had his 
eye not only on the individual plant or animal, but on the whole of which it was a part.  
He was looking, that is, at both the species and the wilderness, considering all from a 
viewpoint both scientific and aesthetic.  Nash gives an anecdote which serves as a good 
sketch of Bartram’s mode of engagement: 
On one occasion in 1775 he climbed a mountain in northern Georgia “from 
whence I enjoyed a view inexpressibly magnificent and comprehensive … [of] 
the mountain wilderness through which I had lately traversed.”  Then he added: 
“my imagination thus wholly engaged in the contemplation of this magnificent 
landscape … I was almost insensible … of … a new species of 
Rhododendron.”123 
 William Bartram was clearly influenced by romantic thought.  He uses the word 
sublime on nearly every page of the Travels, marking “the first extensive use of that term 
in American letters.”124  He also espoused primitivist ideas, describing “the primitive 
state of man” as “peaceable, contented and sociable.”125  Yet I should note that Bartram 
was the older contemporary of Wordsworth and Coleridge, and they were the ones 
influenced by his work, not vice versa.126  This turns upside down any idea that the 
American naturalists’ exuberance for wild nature was derivative from or imitative of the 
European poets.  Bartram knew what he was talking about, and his philosophical, 
aesthetic and ethical insights are neither scripted nor predictable, but grow organically 
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out of his engagement with nature.  His observations of the carnivorous plants caused 
him to wonder whether “the vital principle or efficient cause of motion and action, in the 
animal and vegetable system, perhaps, may be more similar than we generally 
apprehend.”127  It is in watching a bear grieve for its slain mother that he questions the 
moral division between “mankind” and “brute creatures:” “The parental and filial 
affections seem to be as ardent, their sensibility and attachment as active and faithful, as 
those observed in human nature.”128  And the landscapes he admires are not only the 
usual mountain ranges, but also the alligator-filled swamps.  Bartram clearly reveled in 
the exuberance and diversity of life, and not only in the grandeur of scenery. Even his 
primitivism was grounded in a great deal of experience and time with the American 
Indians.  Much of his travels were through the Cherokee nation, and he wrote important 
and pioneering ethnographical studies of that tribe and the Creeks.129  The 
comprehensiveness of many of these early naturalists thus included being students of 
anthropology.   
 Another great naturalist who would exert a profound affect on American 
environmental thought was the Prussian explorer Alexander von Humboldt.  Humboldt, 
like Bartram, combined an aesthetic immersion in nature with rigorous scientific inquiry.  
His compelling vision of nature was as a complex web of relations, a world fraught with 
unsuspected interconnections forming a beautiful and intricate harmony.  Though the 
term would not be coined for many more years, Humboldt’s science was undeniably 
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ecological.  He traveled the world, most notably in the South American tropics, 
everywhere taking measurements and more measurements—of temperatures, air 
pressures, magnetic fields, depths, heights and even the blueness of the sky, anything 
that could be measured.  He provided detailed instructions on what other travelers and 
expeditions should measure and made himself a clearing house for such data.130   
 His own, early description of his project is helpful, especially for its explicitly 
relational understanding of the unity of nature, that is, as harmony: 
I shall collect plants and fossils, and with the best of instruments make 
astronomic observations.  Yet this is not the main purpose of my journey.  I shall 
endeavor to find out how nature’s forces act upon one another, and in what 
manner the geographic environment exerts its influence on animals and plants.  
In short, I must find out about the harmony of nature.131 
 Humboldt’s ecological vision led to a richer understanding of the consequences 
of human actions.  This in turn provides the ground for a conservation ethic.  A sample 
exhortation shows him to be remarkably close to contemporary environmental concerns: 
“By felling the trees which cover the tops and sides of mountains,” he asserted, 
“men in every climate prepare at once two calamities for future generations; want 
of fuel and scarcity of water.”132 
The want of fuel is easy to predict, but foretelling the scarcity of water demonstrates 
sophisticated understanding of ecosystem functioning. His ecology also has, as 
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commentator Aaron Sachs says, a “social edge.”133  There is no call to preservation, but 
devastating critiques of the violence which European conquest and colonialism had done 
to the social and ecological relations which constituted the American lands, critiques 
which grew out of an intimate knowledge of and appreciation for those relations.  
 Humboldt’s influence on American culture, although astoundingly unknown 
today, is hard to overestimate.   
Editions of his books sold out repeatedly.  Ralph Waldo Emerson called 
Humboldt “one of those wonders of the world … who appear from time to time, 
as if to show us the possibilities of the human mind”; Henry David Thoreau 
classified New England’s climate zones according to Humboldt’s model of plant 
ecology. … Walt Whitman would start to suffuse his poetry with the concept of 
“Cosmos,” a term that suggested the world’s overarching but mysterious 
harmony and that Whitman stole directly from Humboldt … It is quite possible 
that no other European had so great an impact on the intellectual culture of 
nineteenth-century America.134  
His influence is especially pronounced among the scientific community and the early 
conservationists.  Benjamin Silliman, James Dwight Dana, Asa Gray and Louis Agassiz, 
fathers of American science, all corresponded with Humboldt significantly, and Agassiz 
relied extensively on his financial assistance.135  The contributions of explorer-scientists 
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like J. N. Reynolds and Clarence King would be nearly unthinkable without the 
influence of Humboldt.   
 Humboldt was an especially significant influence on John Muir, who began his 
career with a naturalist’s expedition initially intended to make directly for the same 
South American tropics Humboldt described in his Personal Narrative.  California was 
originally a side-track, and later in life, Muir did finally make it to South America.  
“How intensely,” he wrote in an early letter, “I desire to be a Humboldt!”136 
 Humboldt’s view of nature, like Bartram’s, is at once both romantic and 
scientific.  Nature is full of affective significance for him, but it is no mere mirror for the 
soul.  Rather, Humboldt spoke of “the power of the external world over the emotions of 
the mind.”137  Sachs contrasts this with Emerson’s view that “Nature always wears the 
colors of the spirit”: 
The person who travels openheartedly into the natural world, the explorer who 
truly attempts to see, can actually be transformed by the experience; he is not 
doomed simply to impose his expectations onto the landscape. … Emerson never 
quite understood this possibility, but Thoreau did.  And so did the landscape 
painter Frederic Church.  And so, too, did America’s entire first generation of 
landscape photographers and explorer-scientists.138 
 Science, at its best, is this activity of ‘truly attempting to see.’  Unlike the 
physico-theologians, Humboldt was not trying to see through nature to God; he wanted 
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to see nature, the cosmos, the harmony of all the parts in “the mysterious relations” of 
“mutual dependence and connection.”139  By focusing on the hidden relations, the 
underlying patterns and laws, Humboldt took the naturalist’s science far beyond 
taxonomic classification and well into ecology, without losing any of the 
comprehensiveness.  It was Humboldt’s idea, for instance, to draw isothermal lines 
across the map, dividing the world into climatic zones, and to see that these latitudinal 
divisions were mirrored, in species composition, by zones of elevation on tropical 
mountains.140  Climbing a mountain, one passes through the same zones of vegetation 
that one passes through on a larger scale when traveling toward higher latitudes.  And as 
with Bartram, this comprehensive study of nature was taken to include the study of 
peoples. 
 Humboldt’s ecological bequest is largely mediated today by Charles Darwin.  
His influence on Darwin was profound: “My whole course of life,” Darwin wrote, “is 
due to having read and re-read [Humboldt’s Personal Narrative] as a youth.”141  Much 
of Darwin’s famous theory is evidently dependent on Humboldt’s work.142  But Darwin 
put front and center an aspect of nature which was notably muted in Humboldt, “the 
centrality of conflict and violence in nature.”143  The relations of nature are not primarily 
harmonious but competitive, a war of all against all.  And whereas Humboldt’s ecology 
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motivated a cosmological, egalitarian sociology, “the desert heat of social Darwinism … 
endorsed both human and environmental exploitation.”144 
  There were, however, a number of Americans who took on Humboldt’s mantel, 
who through exploration sought to work out a comprehensive and relational view of 
nature and, to a greater or lesser extent, continued his cosmological critiques of 
exploitation and oppression.  Thoreau and Muir were among these disciples.  But their 
number also included many known primarily as explorers: J. N. Reynolds, Clarence 
King, George Melville, and John Wesley Powell. 
 Clarence King is an important case, because he also embodied both scientist and 
artist, but in him these roles were not organically united.  They rocked him with inner 
tension as he alternately renounced and swore fealty to the two modes of engaging 
nature.  By King’s time, science was becoming increasingly specialized and 
professionalized, but he maintained a more Humboldtian drive toward a comprehensive 
view of nature: “Ironize and ridicule specialism,” he wrote in a note to himself.145   
 But his poetic vision got him into trouble in his work for the California 
Geological Survey.  A fellow scientist commented that “that fellow had rather sit on a 
peak all day, and stare at those snow-mountains, than find a fossil in the metamorphic 
Sierra.”146  A chastised King was assigned to do some solitary, serious work, as a way to 
shape up, work which was clearly subservient to gold prospecting interests, the “vulgar 
                                                 
144
 Sachs, Humboldt Current, 13.  Leopold, among others, will find a very different social upshot to 
Darwin, one much more egalitarian.  But social Darwinism, which held that the hardships and carnage of 
economic and military competition were necessary correlates of social progress and should not be avoided, 
certainly had center stage for awhile. 
145
 Sachs, Humboldt Current, 238. 
146
 William Gab cited in Sachs, Humboldt Current, 203. 
 53 
gold-dirt” as King had called it.147  And he did, in fact, find a key fossil which dated the 
gold belt, greatly assisting the exploiters.  True to the criticism, however, it left him 
feeling flat.  He became bitter and resentful toward science, finding it mechanical and 
dehumanizing. 
 Six years later, however, he made another substantial discovery.  This one was 
on Mt. Shasta, descriptions of which had originally inspired his scientific career.148  On 
Shasta, he found active glaciers, unsuspected even by Agassiz to exist in the United 
States.149  This was a discovery full of importance to the understanding of nature on the 
grandest scale, full of imaginative significance and of no use at all to exploitative 
industry.  “Science suddenly recaptured King’s spirit,” writes Sachs.150  And King did go 
on to become one of the most significant men of science of his day.  He “would become 
the youngest person ever elected to the American Academy of Sciences” and the first 
director of the U.S. Geological Survey.151  The latter is more important than may first be 
supposed, for the founding of the Survey represents a serious shift in land use policy, 
laying groundwork for future conservation.  As Sachs describes it, “suddenly, the 
opinion of civilian scientists about the appropriate use of federal lands was deemed more 
important than the opinion of army men or business leaders.”152 
 These explorer scientists, like Bartram, Humboldt and King, spent a great portion 
of their lives living in the wilderness, studying the wilderness, delighting in the sublimity 
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and beauty of the wilderness and often enough being terrified for their lives by the forces 
of nature which hold sway in the wilderness.  Their primary project was not the defense 
of nature, but understanding nature.  Even so, their insights into the workings of nature 
and the interaction of social and natural forces gave them serious reservations about 
western “progress.”  Humboldt frequently decried the exploitation of nature and 
indigenous peoples.  King called the westward expansion a “vast ACT OF 
POSSESSION,” a “great sweeping campaign against nature, [a] prodigious advance of a 
horde of homemakers.”153  Nature was no mere blank for them.  They knew it was more 
than a store of resources for economic growth.  Nature, they saw, was a balance of 
forces, forces more powerful than civilization and fraught with complex 
interconnections.  If civilization did not understand and adapt, that is, bow, to these 
forces, it would be sure to fail. 
 In the early twentieth century, ecologists continued to make advances in the 
understanding of wild nature, contributions which would inspire the rise of 
environmental ethics.  They were also thrust into national awareness as the country 
turned to them for help; the prairie sod had been broken against the naturalists’ advice, 
and rain had not followed the plow.  Great dust storms blew across the country, 
sprinkling ships on the Atlantic seaboard with sand from the plains of the Midwest.154 
 Though ecological perspectives and methods had been clearly present in the 
naturalists, especially in Humboldt, ecology took its place as a recognized field of 
professional science with Eugenius Warming’s The Oecology of Plants: An Introduction 
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to the Study of Plant Communities (1895, revised and translated into English in 1909).155  
If the sciences were going to be split into a multitude of narrow specialties, then ecology 
would be the specialty that looked at the holistic dynamics, the interconnections; it 
would be the field that specialized in the big picture once more.  As is evident in 
Warming’s title, community was the central metaphor.  Ecology studied, according to 
Warming, “the manifold and complex relations subsisting between the plants and 
animals that form one community.”156  In 1919, the American ecologist Victor Shelford 
simply defined ecology as “the science of communities.”157  The communal relations are 
more complex than just competition.  They include many shades of helpful and harmful 
connections and dependencies from symbiosis to parasitism. 
 Warming went farther than the idea that plants and animals formed communities 
though; he claimed that these communities changed gradually until they reached a stable, 
climax community.  Historian of ecology Donald Worster describes the importance of 
this: 
The ultimate goal of nature, in other words, is nothing less than the most diverse, 
stable, well-balanced, self-perpetuating society that can be devised to meet the 
requirements of each habitat.  Geographers … were describing with their 
“formations” and “life zones” the end products of millions of years of trial-and-
error experimentation.  And it was this idea of successional development toward 
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a climax equilibrium that Warming made central to the new science of 
ecology.158 
Frederic Clements, of the University of Nebraska, was a particularly influential and 
adamant supporter of the idea of climax communities through the middle of the century.  
Taking a page from the social Darwinist, Herbert Spencer, he argued further that the 
ecological community was actually an organism in its own right:159 
The unit of vegetation, the climax formation, is an organic entity.  As an 
organism, the formation arises, grows, matures, and dies. … The climax 
formation is the adult organism, the fully developed community…160 
In any case, it is clear that idea of a climax community had taken on normative elements 
of being the true end or purpose inherent in the landscape.  Many of the ecologists of 
that day argued for ecological reserves.  The “eminent ecologist” Shelford, mentioned 
above, “was an early proponent of protected wildlands big enough to sustain populations 
of large carnivores.”161  If the historic, climax community is the best, healthiest state of 
nature, then the western farmer with his plow is clearly a disrupter and destroyer, an 
outsider to the system. 
 The dustbowl could not have made this more evident.  The prairie climax, which 
Clements claimed had held steady for millions of years, was torn up and blowing in the 
wind.162  “Rain follows the plow,” declared Charles Dana Wilber in 1881, and it became 
the hope and motto of the westward advancing sodbuster.  “The Creator never imposed a 
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perpetual desert upon the earth,” Wilber said, “but, on the contrary, has so endowed it 
that man, by the plow, can transform it, in any country, into farm areas.”163  And so, 
against the recommendations of many scientists, including John Wesley Powell, the 
western prairies were plowed under.  Dust storms in the 1890s nearly reversed the trend 
but were effectively forgotten when the rains returned.  During World War I, President 
Wilson called on the farmers to plant more wheat to support the war effort.164  In 1879, 
there were 12 million acres harvested in the plains states; by 1929 that number was 103 
million.165  Then 1934 came, the driest year on record, and a single dust storm dropped 
twelve tons of dirt on Chicago and continued east until it sifted dust into the White 
House.166  And the storms continued to increase for several years, before beginning to 
subside.  Something was clearly wrong.   
 Debates raged, disturbingly consonant with today’s debates on global warming, 
over whether these storms were manmade.  In 1936, the report of the government panel, 
the Great Plains Committee, gave its verdict: 
Without a murmur of qualification, the committee concluded that the Dust Bowl 
was a wholly manmade disaster, produced by a history of misguided efforts to 
“impose upon the region a system of agriculture to which the Plains are not 
adapted.”  The essence of the tragedy, as they understood it, was a failure to heed 
the lessons of ecology.  “Nature,” they observed, “has established a balance in 
the Great Plains by what in human terms would be called the method of trial and 
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error.  The white man has disturbed this balance; he must restore it or devise a 
new one of his own.”167   
The ecological doctrine of a climax community—the idea that the balance of nature 
consists in a community of plants and animals, and that this balance is very much 
disturbable—was indelibly imprinted on the public consciousness. 
 Ever since, the scientific community has been a driving force in the 
environmental movement, inclusive of wilderness preservation.  Consider the 
extraordinary impact of the ecologist Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), considered 
to be one of the two most significant volumes, along with Leopold’s Sand County 
Almanac (1949), in the twentieth-century environmental movement.168  And do not 
forget Barry Commoner, the plant physiologist and author of The Closing Circle (1971), 
who became a prominent environmental leader after taking up the issue of atomic fallout 
and its ecological significance for people and nature.169  In this volume he popularized 
the ecological perspective in a set of four “laws”: 1) “Everything is connected to 
everything else;” 2) “Everything must go somewhere;” 3) “Nature knows best” and 4) 
“There is no such thing as a free lunch.”170  These four laws capture nature as relational 
(first law), finite (second law), tending towards a state of balance (third law) and 
establishing limits on economic and technological possibilities (fourth law).   Beyond 
Carson and Commoner, through the 1960s and 70s, there arose a large number of 
environmental leaders and activists who were professional ecologists and biologists. 
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 In the 1980s a new applied branch of ecology was launched, conservation 
biology, to work out methods for preserving the abundance and diversity of wild life. 
This discipline was formed against the growing realization of the enormity of species 
loss.  E. O. Wilson and other biologists declared that we are in the sixth great extinction 
event in the history of life on earth.171  A focus on species diversity and extinction was 
growing during the late sixties and the seventies, as witness David Ehrenfeld’s 1970 text, 
Biological Conservation.172 But it was in the nineteen-eighties that an interdisciplinary 
focus on the preservation of biodiversity really began in earnest in terms of publication 
and professional activity.  Many point to the volume edited by Michael Soulé and B. A. 
Wilcox, Conservation Biology: An Evolutionary-Ecological Perspective, (1980), as a 
watershed moment for the new field.  Soulé, also a founder of the Society for 
Conservation Biology, called it a crisis discipline.173  The Society was founded in 1986 
and issues a highly regarded academic journal, Conservation Biology.174  It is a major 
voice in the current conservation movement.   
 Some have looked at the birth of conservation biology as the beginning of a 
scientific conservation.  As I hope I have made abundantly clear, that is not the case at 
all.  Concern for species preservation is as old as concern for wilderness preservation.175  
The problems and the concerns are not new.  What is new is the professional 
organization of scientists from across disciplines to address the challenges of actually 
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preserving biodiversity—questions of reserve size and placement, of the relative impact 
of different land use strategies, and the like—especially through the application of theory 
from “systematics, genetics, ecology, and evolutionary biology.”176  Also distinctive was 
the explicit adoption of a normative stance as foundational to a scientific field, namely, 
“that biodiversity is good and ought to be preserved.”177  And wilderness preservation 
has maintained a prominent place among conservation biology’s strategies for protecting 
biodiversity, although the field’s domain clearly reaches far beyond the boundaries of 
protected lands. 
 The Wildlands Project, at present the most ambitious and comprehensive effort 
towards wilderness preservation and restoration, is driven and shaped by conservation 
biology and conservation biologists. It’s “four fundamental goals” clearly grow out of an 
ecological understanding of nature: 
1. Represent, in a system of protected areas, all native ecosystem types and 
seral stages178 across their natural range of variation. 
2. Maintain viable populations of all native species in natural patterns of 
abundance and distribution. 
3. Maintain ecological and evolutionary processes, such as disturbance 
regimes, hydrological processes, nutrient cycles, and biotic interactions, 
including predation. 
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4. Design and manage the system to be responsive to short-term and long-
term environmental change and to maintain the evolutionary potential of 
lineages.179 
Reed Noss, ecologist, former editor of Conservation Biology and science director for the 
Wildlands Project, sums up the feeling of many contemporary biologists: “Wilderness 
recovery, I firmly believe, is the most important task of our generation.”180 
 The historical development of wilderness appreciation limned in chapter II is not 
separate from this history of wilderness affirming scientists.  Stepping back a bit, 
chronologically, I wish to discuss the place of the three giants of wilderness thought—
Thoreau, Muir and Leopold—in this context of naturalists and ecologists.  These three 
were well informed and significant contributors to this scientific tradition, a fact 
obviously true Leopold, but less well appreciated of Thoreau and Muir.   
 Thoreau, as a scientist, was clearly influenced greatly by Humboldt and 
continued his ecological focus on relations and interconnections.  When two translations 
of Humboldt’s Ansichten der Natur were made available, Thoreau bought both.181  He 
classified vegetative regions in New England according to Humboldt’s schemes. The 
obsession in Walden with measuring the depths of the ponds and recording freezing and 
thawing dates seems due also to his influence.  But, while Thoreau always exhibited a 
careful attention to and moral regard for nature, it is the Thoreau after Walden that is 
most interesting in this regard.  After his Walden experience, Thoreau turned his 
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attention more and more to science.  He read Linnaeus, Lyell and even the early 
Darwin.182  He turned his attention to ecological questions.  He became a pioneering 
expert on the workings of forest succession, was indeed one of the first to use the 
term.183  For instance, it was Thoreau that solved several ecological riddles by 
demonstrating the important role played by squirrels in distributing the seeds of trees.184   
Worster tells us that “even Louis Agassiz … was not his superior as a field naturalist.”185  
His studies of the area lakes were a rigorous and lasting bequest to limnology as well.186 
 He became especially interested in understanding what New England must have 
been like before the arrival of whites, and whether the forest could be restored, a 
question startlingly anticipatory of modern environmental work. 
I take infinite pains to know the phenomena of the spring, for instance, thinking 
that I have here the entire poem, and then, to my chagrin, I hear that it is but an 
imperfect copy that I possess and have read, that my ancestors have torn out 
many of the first leaves and grandest passages, and mutilated it in many places.  I 
should not like to think that some demigod had come before me and picked out 
some of the best of the stars.  I wish to know an entire heaven and an entire 
earth.187 
There is even a passage in which Thoreau anticipates the idea of a climax to succession, 
of a community of species best fitted to the geographical conditions: 
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In a wood that has been left alone for the longest period the greatest regularity 
and harmony in the disposition of the trees will be observed, while in our 
ordinary woods man has often interfered and favored the growth of other kinds 
than are best fitted to grow there naturally.188 
 All of Thoreau’s discussions of nature, whether aesthetic or scientific, are all 
rooted in his commitment to a daily, immersive intimacy with nature.  And his intimate 
familiarity with the diversity of life around him was startling. 
Thoreau’s knowledge of the lands surrounding Concord was so vast that some of 
the town’s children believed that, like God, Henry had created it all.  His 
knowledge of flora was so precise, a rare fern species not seen for a hundred 
years was recently rediscovered by examining his surveying notes, and his 
examination of the succession of forest trees is a seminal essay for modern 
ecology.189 
The later Thoreau did not leave any major published works spelling out the more 
ecological view of nature he was developing, but his extensive journals from this period 
are a rich bequest still appreciated by naturalists, both amateur and professional.190   
 Sachs, though perhaps a little too eager to see everything in terms of Humboldt, 
gives a good sense of the enormous promise that was cut off by Thoreau’s early death: 
Just as the French poet Charles Baudelaire … found a soul mate reflected in the 
horrific work of Edgar Allan Poe (himself an admiring reader of [Humboldt’s] 
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Cosmos), so did Thoreau dedicate himself to interpreting Humboldt. … Many 
scholars of American literature have expressed dismay at his seeming descent 
into scientific list making in the 1850s, but [Laura Dassow] Walls argues 
persuasively that Thoreau died in 1862 while still trying to work out in his 
journals and essays what Humboldt’s social ecology meant for the United 
States.191 
 If we suspect that Thoreau may have been at points imitating Humboldt, it is very 
clear that Muir set out to do just that.  Muir tells us as much.  Fortunately, perhaps, for 
the fate of the American wilderness, Muir’s original trip, following in the footsteps of 
Humboldt’s Personal Narrative, to the Amazon jungles was prevented, and he ended up 
in California.192  There, he wandered up into the Sierras and his destiny was sealed.  
Muir was a serious and avid botanist, and his descriptions of the Sierras and other 
wildernesses are almost unbearably full of botanical nomenclature.  His disputes with 
Clarence King demonstrate a not insignificant sophistication with respect to geology as 
well.  Indeed, Muir’s competence as a naturalist is fairly well known, but a few things 
are worth mentioning here.     
 Muir’s approach to nature, like Thoreau’s, was acutely attentive to detail, 
informed by a rigorous grounding in science and thoroughly sympathetic and affective.  
He too accepted the Humboldtian understanding of nature as bound into a relational 
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whole: “When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else 
in the universe.”193 
 Most of Muir’s writings are clearly driven by the project of wilderness 
preservation.  Muir wants his readers to come fall in love with certain places so that they 
will help protect them.  Scientific and philosophical content are sometimes spread very 
thin.  Sachs points to the lesser-known Cruise of the Corwin as the great exception to 
this in Muir’s writings, where nature gets a more balanced and nuanced philosophical 
treatment.194  It is only in the Cruise, for instance, that we see wilderness as a place 
where people can belong.195  Man’s abuse of nature is contrasted to a rich vision of man 
in harmony with nature, a vision inspired by the lifestyles of the indigenous peoples in 
Alaska and Siberia.  Muir’s treatment of them was not as beings somehow outside of 
culture; rather he offers a detailed appreciation for their culture—their arts, 
manufactures, religion—especially the humility with which they approached the 
environment.196  He was astounded by their consistent ability to interpret and navigate 
the seemingly blank landscape which perpetually baffled him and his fellow scientists.197  
The many links between the exploitation of nature and the oppression of the Eskimos did 
not escape his notice, and he was quick to condemn it in each aspect.   
 That Muir should be deeply interested in indigenous cultures is not surprising, 
given his enthusiasm for Humboldt.  His own copies of Humboldt’s volumes show 
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extensive marginalia regarding the discussions of Indians.198  It is the lack of any 
attention or sympathy given to the original inhabitants of the wilderness in the U.S. 
which is both surprising and disturbing.   Compared to Muir’s treatment of the relation 
between people and nature in the Cruise, Sachs finds the later, purely preservationist 
project, to be something of a cynical compromise: 
Perhaps he also grew to accept the shape of white American civilization as 
inevitable.  He seemed to retreat to the position that, if we were going to have 
such an effete, meaningless, money-drive culture in our cities and even our rural 
areas, we ought at least to preserve a few parcels of slightly more wild land. … 
Muir’s rich social and ecological visions had been reduced to “the cause of 
saving samples of God’s best mountain handiwork.”199 
While Sachs clearly understates the depth of Muir’s social critique, his preservation 
project was certainly politically conditioned. 
 Unlike Thoreau and Muir, Aldo Leopold was a professional scientist his whole 
life, first for the Forest Service and then as a professor of Game Management at the 
University of Wisconsin.  He had a solid foundation in the ecological sciences, 
graduating from the Yale School of Forestry,200 and contributed substantially to the 
development of science and conservation.  His 1933 Game Management created a new 
discipline which still thrives today, an application of ecological science to the 
conservation of wild game.  Given the utilitarian emphasis of the Yale School of 
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Forestry, funded by the Pinchot family,201 one might expect Leopold to be concerned 
only with the preservation of those species that served as a recreational resource to the 
sportsman.  But he did not take this route for he found it incompatible with the 
ecological understanding of nature.  Even before he published Game Management, 
Leopold had voiced the harshest criticism for the “national game of economic 
expansion” and its heedless destruction of the land and its biotic community.202  The 
science of game management was rather a meliorating and subversive attempt to “set up 
within the economic juggernaut certain new cogs and wheels whereby the residual love 
of nature … may be  made to recreate at least a fraction of those values which their love 
of ‘progress’ is destroying.”203  
 Leopold was well familiar with the ecological notion of community and made it 
the core tenet of his view of nature.  He had met the Cambridge ecologist, Charles Elton, 
and many have scholars have speculated that Elton’s Animal Ecology (1927) was a 
significant influence on Leopold’s thought.204  Given the interdependence of all life in a 
biotic community of organisms, soil and water, argues Leopold, ascribing utility to any 
one part of this community in isolation is ultimately unintelligible: 
The emergence of ecology has placed the economic biologist in a peculiar 
dilemma: with one hand he points out the accumulated findings of his search for 
utility, or lack of utility, in this or that species; with the other he lifts the veil 
from a biota so complex, so conditioned by interwoven cooperating and 
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competitions, that no man can say where utility begins or ends. No species can be 
“rated” without the tongue in the cheek; the old categories of “useful” and 
“harmful” have validity only as conditioned by time, place, and circumstance. 
The only sure conclusion is that the biota as a whole is useful, and [the] biota 
includes not only plants and animals, but soils and waters as well.205 
So Leopold follows in the train of ecologists who, with Humboldt, find the 
interconnection and interdependence of nature and culture to require a more egalitarian 
moral view, a sense that we are all in this together.  This Leopold says, is the real lesson 
of Darwin: 
 It is a century now since Darwin gave us the first glimpse of the origin of 
species.  We know now … that men are only fellow-voyagers with other 
creatures in the odyssey of evolution.  This new knowledge should have given us, 
by this time, a sense of kinship with fellow-creatures; a wish to live and let live; a 
sense of wonder over the magnitude and duration of the biotic enterprise. 
 Above all we should, in the century since Darwin, have come to know 
that man, while now captain of the adventuring ship, is hardly the sole object of 
its quest, and that his prior assumptions to this effect arose from the simple 
necessity of whistling in the dark.206 
Leopold wrote extensively about wilderness, addressing its relation to recreational 
possibilities, cultural health, scientific knowledge and wildlife preservation.  But 
wilderness was never merely the absence of humanity for Leopold.  I can find that 
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interpretation nowhere.  For Leopold, wilderness and conservation are about a state of 
health in the land, the healthy functioning of the biotic community, and one of the chief 
values of wilderness to culture is to provide scientists with such an example of health.  
Without an image of health, we could neither understand nor ameliorate the dysfunction 
we often cause in rural and urban landscapes.   
 Importantly, Leopold came to this understanding of nature as biotic community, 
as having an internal standard of health, through a thorough and wide-ranging study of 
wild lands, of actual biotic communities.  Having recently traveled to the German 
forests, which had been intensively managed under the utilitarian, resource version of 
conservation he had studied at Yale, Leopold went to the Chihuahua Mountains of the 
Rio Gavilan region of Mexico.  The contrast was striking to him and enlightening, a 
teshuvah moment in Leopold’s development.  Here was a “picture of ecological health” 
that revealed to him just how diseased the other forests he had known were.207   
 Leopold, the naturalist, attains and offers profound insight into the nature of 
wilderness because his knowledge has the character of intimate acquaintance.  The 
importance of the scientists’ contribution to American conservation is due in part to this 
character of scientific inquiry.  The colonist and pioneer each approached the American 
landscape with a vision to remake it; they knew what it ought to be before they ever saw 
it.  Understandably, their interpretations of the biotic communities were colored and 
shaped by their preconceived goals.  The chief goal of the naturalist, however, is to 
bracket her preconceptions as well as she is able in order to see nature more truly.  The 
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gift of the scientist is not to tell us, a priori, what is good for nature but to look at nature 
and tell us when she is healthy. 
 Of course cultural glasses can never be taken off completely, and the lessons of 
ecology have been subjected to more than one moral reading.  On the one hand, the 
striving of each animal for survival, eating other animals until being eaten in turn, and 
the utter indifference with which stochastic disturbances wipe out huge swaths of life 
would seem to justify a brutal individualism, perhaps even war.  On the other hand, the 
interdependence of all creatures on each other and on the whole community, and the 
vulnerability of this arrangement to occasional disaster, could motivate a very different 
egalitarian communitarianism, a sense that we are all in this together.  That Herbert 
Spencer’s social Darwinism and Aldo Leopold’s land ethic could both find inspiration 
from evolution is cautionary to the one who would offer a moral reading, to say the least.  
But the lessons of evolution and ecology can not be without moral significance.  We 
share an interdependence with the whole of the biotic community, a community that has 
attained a certain amount of balance with the forces and processes of nature.  I find I 
must side with Leopold.  Understanding and protecting that balance is ethically, 
esthetically and prudentially the right thing to do.  
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CHAPTER IV 
FLOURISHING NATURAL PURPOSE 
 
The experience of the Other as a void or an absence is a prelude to invasion and 
instrumentalization, whereas the experience of the Other as a presence is the 
prelude to dialogue.  
Val Plumwood208 
 
 Having thickened the historical tapestry of wilderness thought, I turn now to the 
problem of how to appropriate this bequest in terms of a conception of wilderness 
worthy to the best of this tradition and which offers help for the problems of today.  
Ideally, a philosophical conception of wilderness should illuminate the aesthetic and 
ethical attitudes which have characterized the preservation movement, be closely tied to 
the ecological perspective of the naturalists’ science and not depend upon an untenable 
separation of humanity from nature.  It would be commodious if this conception were 
somewhat consonant with the Wilderness Act, such that it may guide its application.  
 Clearly, what I have called the negative conception will not do.   This conception 
treats wilderness as a polar opposite of culture, seeing its essence and value in the 
absence of human influence.  This is the view which Cronon and Callicott have in mind 
when they deny the helpfulness and truthfulness of wilderness thinking.  Unfortunately, 
this view, which treats humanity as essentially spoiling of nature, is easily read into the 
Wilderness Act and is commonly assumed to be the main idea of the wilderness 
preservation tradition.  Fortunately the negative conception is not the main idea in the 
tradition or the Act, and skepticism about this version of wilderness does not require 
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abandoning the idea of wilderness.  Rejecting the nature/culture dualism does not entail 
losing the distinction.  No one is clearer or more helpful on this point than the late 
Australian ecofeminist Val Plumwood: 
The idea that eliminating dualism between nature and culture implies eliminating 
distinction between nature and culture involves a misinterpretation of dualism, 
conflating the nature/culture polarity which underlies many of the problems 
discussed above, with nature/culture differentiation.  Dualism creates a polarity, 
and a polarity involves very much more than a distinction.209 
The distinction between nature and culture, between wilderness and pastoral or urban 
landscapes, is of course essential to the preservation project, but the difference is not 
defined oppositionally.  “We should not abandon concepts of nature and wilderness,” 
Plumwood argues, “but we need to create new, non-colonizing understandings and 
situate them within the context of a renewed, radical ecology committed to healing the 
nature/culture split.”210  Unlike the dualistic, negative conception, a helpful, positive 
conception of wilderness will be compatible 
with the kind of thoroughgoing environmentalism that aims to recognize 
everywhere in our lives what has been systematically denied and backgrounded 
as part of this nature/culture dualism—our dependency on the active agency and 
“labor” of nature and biospheric processes, even in our joint creations, and the 
limits this imposes on the development of human culture.211 
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I take up her charge here, to create a new, helpful conception of wilderness, as my task. 
The key to this task, I offer in agreement with Plumwood, is to understand wilderness as 
a presence instead of an absence. 
 Such a positive conception of wilderness is indeed possible, one which supports a 
better interpretation of the Wilderness Act and of the writings of Thoreau, Muir and 
Leopold and which even illuminates the contemporary dilemmas regarding wilderness 
management and ecological restoration.  To start, I go back to the etymology of 
wilderness.  “The only wilderness true to the etymological roots of the word,” claims 
Nash, “is that which humans do not influence in any way whatsoever.”212  But the 
etymology he gives for wilderness is “the place of untamed beasts.”213  How he gets 
from this etymology to such a strong position on human influence, I don’t know.  Surely 
there is a difference between taming the animals and having any influence on the land 
whatsoever. 
 In chapter one, I came to a reading of the etymology of wilderness very similar to 
Nash’s “place of untamed beasts.”  Wildeor in Old English means “wild animal” or 
“wild beast.”  It was joined with the suffix –en to form an adjective wildern, now 
obsolete, literally “consisting of wild animals.”  To this was added the suffix -ness, 
which usually signifies an abstract property but is here used to form a concrete noun, 
“that which consists of wild animals.” There is no mention of human influence in this 
etymology, except as implied by wild, as in untamed.  What is clear is the centrality of 
animal presence to the notion of wilderness. 
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 It is tempting at this point to say that wilderness is a place whose character is 
determined by wild animals.  I think this would not be wrong, but I would like to expand 
it a bit.  Our current understanding of wilderness, unlike that of the ancient Anglophones 
who coined the term for us, has been influenced by the insights afforded by evolution 
and ecology.  The wilderness is not just a collection, a congeries, of wild animals, and 
the animals are not discrete objects.  Wild nature is an assemblage of processes and 
functions embedded in a complex web of relations.  These processes and relations 
constitute a Heraclitean flux, revealing emergent order and balance, that is λογος.   
 The pertinent lesson from evolution is about the nature of purpose in organisms.  
Nature is full of purposed being, of features and functions that cannot be understood 
without reference to their end, their τελος.  A purpose of leaves is to turn sunlight to 
energy, and a purpose of wings is usually flight.  The lesson of evolution that I am 
interested in is that the purposes of these adaptations are explicable only when referred 
to the perpetuation of a species.  An analysis of an adaptation that does not reference the 
biological fitness of the organism is thus untenable.  The natural purpose of the bison’s 
coat may be to keep the bison warm; however, it is not to keep the hunter warm, no 
matter how well it works for this.  Other sorts of teleological explanations were common 
before Darwin.214  The doctrine of signatures is a clear case in point, according to which 
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the purpose of a plant’s shape is to communicate its medicinal value. Indeed, some pre-
Darwin scientists seemed to think that all natural purposes must ultimately come back to 
human ends.  One such seventeenth-century naturalist “described the starfish, but 
acknowledged that he did not know its use.  However, he felt that ‘doubtless it is good 
for something, there being nothing made in vain.’”215  
 An upshot of this evolutionary lesson is that, in natural teleology, species are 
ultimate ends.  It is fruitless to ask what the purpose of the bison is; that there may be 
bison is sufficient unto itself.  Teleology in nature is thus plural and local, purpose with a 
lower-case p.  This is an egalitarian sort of purpose; if species are ends in themselves and 
not evaluated in terms of being good for something or other, than there are no 
intrinsically better or worse species.216   
 Biologists often prefer to discuss adaptations in terms of functions instead of 
purposes.  This is part of an understandable tendency to shy away from terminology 
which might suggest conscious, mental forethought.  The shying takes them too far in 
this instance though, and they end up using a word which means somewhat less than 
what they intend.217  Allen and Bekoff distinguish various levels of teleology on the one 
hand from mere effect on the other.  Bird migrations may have the effect of signaling to 
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people that winter is coming218, but this is not an adaptive end of migration.  It is a mere 
effect, a side effect, of migration.  When biologists speak of a trait’s function, they mean 
something which explains the trait’s existence or maintenance in the species.219  But in 
common parlance, the word function is ambiguous between a mere effect and a 
teleological end.  The bison’s coat may be said to function just fine as a hunter’s 
garment.  It does keep him warm.  Roundabout adjectives must be added to clarify the 
sense of function: it is not the function, the biological function, the proper function.   
Allen and Bekoff, clearly not meaning psychological intention, resort to speaking of 
natural design to catch the stronger sense.220 
 Function is a weaker word than purpose, because it does not as clearly imply that 
the end is explanatory of the trait.  In some contexts it carries this connotation, and 
biologists generally restrict it to that sense when discussing an adaptation.  But 
something can function for any externally imposed end it happens to work for, such as 
signaling the change of seasons to interested farmers. 
 The relevant definition of function in the OED is sense 3: “The special kind of 
activity proper to anything; the mode of action be which it fulfills its purpose.”  This 
definition explains function in terms of purpose, which would count against function 
being in any way less objectionable than purpose.  It also highlights a subtle issue of 
usage.  Purpose designates the teleological end; function designates the “mode of action” 
by which the end is achieved.  Thus reproduction is not properly a function of sex but a 
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purpose of sex; the function is the mode of action which contributes to this, the injection 
of sperm into the uterus.  The general preference of biologists for the term function in 
place of purpose is thus not only ambiguous but also poorer English.  This distinction 
further explains why function is ambiguous.  To claim something has a function is only 
to claim that the mode of action belongs to it.  The end served could be quite external.  
Whereas to say that something has a purpose is to say that the end belongs to it in some 
way.    
 The relevant definition of purpose in the OED is sense 2: “The reason for which 
something is done or made, or for which it exists; the result or effect intended or sought; 
the end to which an object or action is directed; aim.”  “The reason for which something 
… exists” is exactly the teleological notion that biologists are after.  In Allen and 
Bekoff’s summary of the standard, etiological view, point 1 is that “Functional claims in 
biology are intended to explain the existence or maintenance of a trait in a given 
population.”221  The purpose is the aim or end which explains the nature of the trait.  The 
function is the “mode of action” by which the purpose is accomplished.   
 Other senses of purpose are indeed very psychological, and even this sense is 
most often used in psychological contexts.  But this is not an overriding connotation, 
such that using the word apart from the psychological context would be awkward.  Allen 
and Bekoff even title their anthology Nature’s Purposes.  The context of biological 
discourse is generally such as to preclude much if any genuine misunderstanding on 
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whether mental intention is implied.  For these reasons I prefer and continue with the 
term purpose to describe the adaptive ends of biological traits.   
 Ecology sheds additional light on the nature of natural purposes.  While the 
persistence of each species represents an irreducible purpose in nature, these purposes 
are not completely separable.  The lesson from ecology is that these natural purposes, the 
adaptations of organisms, have the mediate goal of the organism flourishing in a niche.  
An organism’s niche is the particular way it uses the resources, including other 
organisms, in the ecosystem.  Natural purposes thus reference each other in a complex 
web.  The food web is but one aspect of this; each organism utilizes other organisms for 
food, and is in turn eaten by yet others.  The adaptations which define an organism’s 
niche depend on both the presence of food of a certain character and any number of 
other background conditions.  The spider’s web is an adaptation for feeding on insects, 
which depends upon there being not only insects but insects adapted to flight.  It also 
depends on the presence of trees or other suitable structures on which to build a web.  
Often, the further up the trophic pyramid a species is, the greater the web of natural 
purposes its own purposes must depend on.  Thus for an apex predator like a wolf or a 
bear to flourish, a wealth of other natural purposes must flourish over a large scale.  The 
continued flourishing of this web of organisms adapted to each other constitutes 
ecosystem function or health.  This functioning presupposes a variety of natural 
processes, including dynamics of water and fire, on which many of the constitutive 
organisms will have adapted dependencies.  Abiotic features of the land, although 
without adaptation themselves, are thus co-opted into the web of teleological relations. 
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 An infrequently mentioned example of a background condition on which there is 
widespread dependence among the plants and animals, but which has been severely 
compromised by human activity around the globe, is nighttime darkness and the 
resulting clear view of the changing constellations.  Light pollution, human-generated 
nighttime lighting especially as directed skyward, is detrimental to many kinds of wild 
flora and fauna, often severely.  On reflection, this is not so surprising, considering that, 
until now, circadian and stellar rhythms have been constant and reliable since the 
beginning of life.  Many organisms, including humans, make use of these signals in 
ordering vital functions.  Other animals use them for navigation during migration.  
Darkness itself is an important ecological niche, as witnessed to by the diversity of 
nocturnal creatures. The Urban Wildlands Group and the UCLA Institute of the 
Environment held a conference on the Ecological Consequences of Artificial Lighting in 
2002, where detrimental effects were explored or suggested regarding reptiles, 
amphibians, fish, birds, mammals, insects and plants.  Light pollution may make 
deciduous trees hold on to their leaves too long.222  Migrating birds crash into lighted 
towers.223  Sea turtles’ hatchlings are prone to wander inland towards the city lights 
instead of towards the surf, and adults are reluctant to lay their eggs on beaches near 
lights.224  And yes, light pollution has been blamed for decreases in moth populations.225  
A physical process of diurnal and stellar rhythms, which has no biological τελος of its 
own, is thus made significant in the teleological context of the biotic community. 
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 The flourishing of any specific natural purpose, including human, is bound up in 
the flourishing of other natural purposes, and ultimately, in the flourishing of the whole.  
The extent to which the individual species are dependent upon and connected to the rest 
of the system is hard to overemphasize.  The effect on the whole of removing any given 
piece is not easily predicted.  When the coyote is exterminated in some areas, for 
instance, the song birds disappear.226  Take out the wrong insects, and we could all be 
lost.  The ecosystem as a whole is both the condition to which the species are adapted 
and the emergent product of their continuous adaptings.227  Each species adapts towards 
a sustainable relation with the ecosystem.   This can go wrong, but over the long haul 
and generally, it tends towards a balance.  To say that nature has a balance, or tends 
towards balance, is not to deny disturbance or dynamism at any number of scales.  But 
the very fact that the species here today have persevered demonstrates that some 
measure of harmony has persisted, that nature has usually shown a kinder hospitality to 
life than our current plague of ‘development’ is showing.  Biotic communities tend 
towards a balance, albeit contingent and subject to disturbance by geological or 
technological happenings. 
                                                 
226
 This is due to what is known as mesopredator release.  When the large predators no longer hold the 
medium predators in check, then those animals vulnerable to medium-sized predators suffer.  C.f. 
Foreman, “From Scenery to Nature,” 576: 
Michael Soulé has shown that native song birds survive in suburban San Diego canyons where 
Coyotes remain; they disappear when Coyotes disappear.  Coyotes eat foxes and prowling house 
cats.  Foxes and cats eat quail, cactus wrens, gnatcatchers, and their nestlings. 
227
 The relationship between natural selection and ecosystem balance is inordinately controversial.  The 
eminent ecologist Eugene Odum argues that there are two “kinds” of natural selection: “organism versus 
organism, which leads to competition, and organism versus environment, which leads to mutualism” 
(“Great Ideas in Ecology,” 543).  Such an approach is at least highly plausible. 
 81 
 A recent shift in ecological theorizing, the “new ecology,” has rendered suspect 
discussions of the balance of nature.228  Extreme versions of this recent emphasis on 
natural disturbance and disequilibria would claim that all nature is chaos and threaten to 
render an ecological ethic obsolete, impossible.  But as I pointed out above, millions of 
species have persisted over time, species which we have proved are not without 
vulnerabilities.  Their persistence would be inexplicable on such a radical view; they 
could not have survived so long under conditions of pure chaos.  Some measure of 
balance in nature therefore is empirically undeniable.   The new ecology in its more 
mature and reasonable form represents a focus on the stochastic and contingent, often 
through the lens of patch dynamics, which sees different patterns and rules holding at 
different scales.229  The balance of nature is a balance as fought against the contingency 
of time and place.  What is thrown out is Balance with a capital B, the idea that there is 
one preordained community best suited to each climatic situation, and that nature will 
inexorably work towards this.  This move in no way contradicts the idea that the biotic 
community generally tends towards a stable, hospitable state, so far as geological and 
climatological forces allow.  This stability does not mean stability at all scalar levels.  
Stochastic events at one level—the rise and fall of populations, disturbance by storm, 
flood and fire—are compatible with stability across a larger scale.  The harmony of 
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nature is Heraclitean λογος, not Parmenidean being.  The new ecology has indeed given 
new impetus to the wilderness preservationists’ emphasis on big areas.  The preserved 
area must be larger than the scale of expected disturbances in order to sustain 
ecosystems for the long term and especially to preserve those species which have 
adapted dependencies on those disturbances.230  
 In brief, the land consists of a biotic community of teleological organisms, whose 
beings are incomprehensible and untenable apart from the ecological matrix in which 
they subsist.  Ecosystems have many quantifiable dynamics which emerge at this 
community level: cycles of energy, nutrients, and water, for instance.  But the important 
point is that the biota taken together, in their relations to each other and to the non-living 
environmental processes around them, forms a roughly coherent system, a functioning 
whole.  This whole is subject to assessments of function and dysfunction—health and 
disease, in Leopold’s terms.  The ecosystem either works for the community of 
organisms which compose it, or it breaks down in any number of ways and degrees. 
 To what extent the emergent features of the ecosystem, such as energy cycles, 
water retention or soil fertility, or ecosystems themselves can be said to have purposes is 
a difficult question.  My account of wilderness is not dependent on a successful 
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teleological account of ecosystems, but would be reinforced and bolstered it.  Many 
concepts which ecologists use—as instance, succession, ecosystem function, ecosystem 
service—are prima facie teleological notions.  Compared to the vast literature on natural 
teleology at the level of the organism, discussions at the ecosystem level have been 
limited.  As products, at least in part, of the activities of organisms, ecosystems have 
some connection to the process of adaptation.  And while ecosystems do not replicate 
themselves, they are constantly being remade by their constituent organisms in ways 
more or less harmonious with the flourishing of those organisms.  If there are features of 
ecosystems, beneficial to many species and maintained by the activities of many species, 
it may be more natural to speak of them as adaptations or functions of the system than of 
the contributing organisms separately.  The existence of mutualist relationships between 
species, as between flowers and pollinators, are not contested.  Perhaps ecosystem 
functions could be understood as very broad, multi-party, mutualist relations.   Even the 
example of pollination is not a binary species-species relationship, but is a process 
maintained by a diverse guild of animals across an array of plants.  There are conceptual 
difficulties to be worked out, but naturalized purpose at the ecosystem level does not 
appear implausible. 
 Returning now to the interpretation of wilderness, I propose that wilderness is 
best understood as land which is characterized by the healthy functioning of an untamed 
biotic community, that is, by the flourishing of natural purposes.  The etymology of 
wilderness suggested the idea that wilderness is land characterized by the presence of 
wild animals.  Thinking rather in the holistic terms of the biotic community yields a 
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richer conception: wilderness is the flourishing of untamed animals and untamed plants 
in untamed relations.  This flourishing achieves a functional wholeness at the system 
level, when it is allowed to determine the whole character of the landscape. “True 
wilderness,” as Dave Foreman writes, means “biological diversity with integrity.”231  
Thinking in terms of natural purpose illuminates just how biological diversity can have 
integrity. 
 This conception of flourishing natural purposes builds on the evolutionary 
understanding of natural teleology as functions aimed at the flourishing of organisms 
and species.  These functions are mediated by adaptations to ecological niches and are 
thus embedded in a complex web of relations.  The flourishing of a single species 
thereby requires the flourishing of many others, which in turn requires the flourishing of 
the whole fabric of natural purposes.  The unrestrained flourishing of natural purposes 
emerges as a large-scale, landscape phenomenon: wilderness. 
 In contrast to wilderness is land where nature is tamed, cultivated and 
domesticated.  These creatures and landscapes have features whose explanation must 
include an overt cultural purpose.  Why does the wool of domestic sheep differ from that 
of wild sheep?  In order to make better textiles.  Why doesn’t a certain grain reproduce 
from seed?  In order to protect the market interest of the genetic engineer.  Why do many 
vast fields contain only a single species of plant? For economic efficiency.  Some parts 
of nature we modify by taming—by removing those wild organisms and processes that 
threaten our wellbeing, for example, predator extermination and fire suppression.  Often 
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we go beyond this to cultivation, adapting organisms and landscapes to the fulfillment of 
our purposes.  At the organism level this is done by artificial selection or, more recently, 
genetic engineering.  At the landscape level this is done by planting, plowing, grazing, 
building, and a host of other activities.  People are quite adept at such land management, 
activities that transform the land for the flourishing and perpetuation of human culture or 
for the utility of some particular political or economic order.  In non-wilderness, cultural 
purposes come to dominate the character of the landscape.   
 This is a difference which falls short of being a polarity.  Cultural purposes can 
be at odds with or in harmony with natural purposes to various degrees and can exist 
together with them in a landscape in various mixtures.  Clearly many recreational and 
spiritual purposes, such as solitude, scenery and primitive travel232, can be pursued in 
many wildernesses without significant effect on ecosystem health.  Most wildernesses 
can handle some amount of game harvest and could even handle small populations of 
people living in primitive style, without thereby ceasing to be wildernesses.  All of this 
however depends on the particular wilderness, and some can take more than others.  
Many cave ecosystems can withstand almost no human presence at all.  Not only can 
cultural and wilderness sometimes coexist in a place, but both cultural and natural 
purpose are sometimes absent from a place.  A moonscape for instance, having no wild 
life, is not properly a wilderness.  Thus the absence of human culture is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for wilderness, and the difference falls short of polarity. 
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 At this point, the definition of wilderness as land characterized by the flourishing 
of natural purposes, may be found too broad without some further clarification.  Many 
places have flourishing wild species, but they are not all wildernesses.   Song birds thrive 
in and probably depend on the hedgerows of European farms.  Raccoons, a native 
species, flourish in suburban and urban landscapes across the United States.  Even living 
room carpets teem with uncultivated dust mites.  But these are not wildernesses.  Why 
not? 
 William Cronon makes this point from another direction.  Part of his trouble with 
the idea of wilderness is that he finds it denigrating of nature nearer to home.  He gives a 
parable of two trees, one in the wilderness and the other planted in a garden.  The 
wilderness dualism, he says, “sees the tree in the garden as artificial—completely fallen 
and unnatural—and the tree in the wilderness as natural—completely pristine and 
wild.”233  
Nothing could be more misleading. The tree in the garden is in reality no less 
other, no less worthy of our wonder and our respect, than the tree in an ancient 
forest that has never known an ax or a saw—even though the tree in the forest 
reflects a more intricate web of ecological relationships.  The tree in the garden 
could easily have sprung from the same seed as the tree in the forest, and we 
claim only its location and perhaps its form as our own.  Both trees stand apart 
from us; both share our common world.  . . .  Both trees in some sense are wild; 
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both in a practical sense now depend on our management and care.  We are 
responsible for both, even though we can claim credit for neither.234  
In Cronon’s terminology: it is all other, so it is all wild.  In my terminology, natural 
purposes are flourishing everywhere, in the garden and the forest.  The challenge is the 
same: what, then, is special about wilderness, if it is not, once again, the absence of 
people? 
 One pragmatic response that all seem agreed upon is that many forms of wildness 
still extant in the world simply cannot flourish in a humanized landscape.  This exclusion 
is not a logical one, inherent in the idea of wilderness, but a practical one, arising from 
the character of the species or processes in question.  Wolves and rattlesnakes do not 
mix well with civilization.  Wilderness preservation allows for the flourishing of these 
natural purposes to continue. 
 But there is more to be said.  Returning to Cronon’s parable, both trees are 
worthy of wonder and respect, but they are not the same.  The “intricate web of 
ecological relationships,” which Cronon mentions but deems inconsequential, is part of 
the flourishing of the natural purposes embodied in the tree.  Both trees are wild to an 
extent, but the tree in the ancient forest is wilder.  The form of the tree is inextricably 
related to its ecological functions.  To the extent that those functions and relations are 
severed, the wildness in the tree in the garden is wildness coitus interruptus.  The 
ecological relations are unrequited; the adaptations are in vain.  Now clearly a great 
portion of the tree’s purposes are not stymied in a garden.  It still extracts nutrients from 
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the soil, photosynthesizes, grows and goes to seed.  What is stymied will depend on both 
the particular characteristics of the tree and of the garden.  A native tree species will be 
wilder in my garden than an imported exotic, in part because it will still flourish in many 
of its ecological relations: its insect defenses will be adapted to the insects that will try to 
eat and pollinate it, its adaptations to soil conditions may match the conditions of my 
yard and the same species of wildlife may eat of it and dwell in it as would in natural 
conditions. 
 Consider, though, an organism more dependent on vast space and complex 
ecosystems.  Consider the crane, the bird Aldo Leopold called “wildness incarnate.”235  
What seemed in Cronon’s essay to be a reasonable thought experiment with two trees 
becomes entirely unconvincing with two cranes.  Put one crane in the wild and one in the 
zoo.  The first migrates thousands of miles in a year, has social relations in its flock and 
eats and breeds in wetlands across the continent.  The second is, well, pretty nearly a 
tragedy, given its stymied potential.  The fantastic adaptations so essential to its crane-
ness are null and void in the context of a zoo. 
 Wilderness is more than what can happen in a garden, even with native species.  
Wilderness is not just a place where some or even many natural purposes flourish; it is a 
place where the whole character of the land is constituted by the flourishing of natural 
purposes in natural relations.  It is land which is wildern—composed of wildness.  So 
understood, wilderness is the full manifestation of the wildness expressed in a limited 
way in the tree in the garden.  Wilderness is land whose structure and character are 
                                                 
235
 A Sand County Almanac, 101. 
 89 
expressions of natural purposes, neither censored nor embellished by our needs for 
safety and utility.  We value wildness everywhere, and wilderness uniquely so, as 
wildness expressed fully in the land. 
 One advantage of this approach is that the wildness of nature in the wilderness 
and the wildness of nature in my backyard are of a piece; both are cut from the fabric of 
flourishing natural purposes.  But my approach, unlike Cronon’s, is also able to discern a 
difference.  In wilderness, the flourishing of natural purpose is unrestrained by culture, 
so that the interaction of natural purposes form the governing processes and structures of 
the landscape and are so able to achieve a functional wholeness. 
 This interpretation can also embrace J. Baird Callicott’s version of sustainable 
development—of maintaining as much wildness in our cultivated landscapes as 
possible—though as a complement, not an alternative as he suggests.  He argues that, 
while much western rangeland should not be set aside as wilderness preserves, it would 
be much better managed if used to raise bison and deer rather than the ecologically 
inappropriate cow.236  However, one need not give up on wilderness to so value wildness 
in other landscapes.  They are as harmonious in spirit as any two projects ever were.  
Indeed, it is not even clear to me that the managing the western prairies for a harvest of 
bison would not be consistent with a wilderness condition, at least in portions of the 
country.  The human is one of the bison’s native predators, after all, to whom it is well 
adapted.   
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 This conception of wilderness also answers Cronon’s complaint that the 
wilderness idea offers only a counsel of despair, of suicide, and no useful guidance.  By 
saying what wilderness is, and not merely what it isn’t, the way is opened for inquiry as 
to what helps or trammels particular wildernesses, particular natural purposes.  
Wilderness preservation thus does not, a priori, mean the removal of people, especially 
those who have lived in the land for an evolutionarily significant period of time.  Rather 
this version of wilderness allows conservationists to evaluate particular land uses (or the 
cessation of traditional land uses) in terms of their effects on particular wildernesses. 
 A careful reading of the American wilderness preservation tradition, as I have 
attempted in chapters two and three, shows that wilderness has overwhelmingly been 
treated as a presence, not an absence.  American wilderness appreciation has been a 
decidedly botanical, zoological and geological affair.  From Thoreau’s lament over lost 
species as leaves and passages torn from the poem of nature237 to Leopold’s question, 
“Of what use are wild areas destitute of their distinctive fauna?”238 the object of 
affection is wild nature as something and as up to something.  
 The wording of the Wilderness Act may give prima facie support to the negative 
conception of wilderness as human absence, and it is often cited to this effect, but a 
better, more coherent, reading is possible with the positive conception of wilderness as 
presence.  The key is to recognize the exclusion of people as a contextual and practical 
requirement rather than a conceptual necessity.  The Wilderness Act is written to address 
a particular problem, the destruction of wilderness under the pressure of economic 
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expansion, with a particular solution, legal designation and protection.  It aims not for an 
ontologically accurate definition of wilderness but for a definition that will identify 
places which could be appropriately and successfully defended in this way.    
 The Act is admittedly ambivalent on the nature of wilderness.  It recognizes 
wilderness areas by the absence of people (only noting that such areas “may” also have 
ecological or scenic value) and then requires that “these shall be administered for the use 
and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for 
future use as wilderness.”239  Wilderness is treated simultaneously as land free from the 
dominating influence of humanity and also as “resource” to be managed for human use.  
How can this be?  It even recognizes wilderness as land without extractive industry and 
then provides for various levels of extraction in certain circumstances.  No wonder 
Plumwood says of American wilderness legislation that “the result of the whole is 
incoherence.”240 
 There are, however, clear indications of the positive conception of wilderness in 
the wording of the Act as well as these shades of the negative.  The key phrase, 
“community of life,” is a mark of Leopold’s influence. Untrammeled is perhaps the 
central word in the Act, with much contest over what is to count as trammeling.  But the 
term is rarely explained, and I suspect, is frequently confused with untrampled.  To 
trammel is “to hinder the free action of; to put restraint upon, fetter, hamper, impede, 
confine.”241  The word originally referred to a type of fish net that entangled the fish in 
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little pockets.  It was later used to describe ropes tied to a horse’s legs, to keep it from 
galloping.  In the Act, the word constitutes an acknowledgement that wilderness has 
purposes and being all its own, from which it should not be hindered. 
 So rather than reading the negative conception as primary in the Act, I suggest 
reading the positive conception as primary for the understanding of wilderness and the 
exclusion of people as the primary practical means indicated for preserving the integrity 
of what is positively there.  The Wilderness Act does not create wildernesses but 
recognizes and protects them.  Its function is primarily the exclusion of “trammeling” 
human influence.  This accounts for the functional definition of wilderness looking very 
negative.  On this reading, allowing some human use, especially recreational, and even 
taking this kind of use as a purpose for the act, poses no interpretational difficulties.  
While exclusion of people is terribly problematic as a definition of wilderness, it is 
eminently reasonable as a scheme for preserving wilderness.  Quoting once again from 
Plumwood: 
If in the present oppositional state of Western society there is a serious problem 
about its human presences and the assumption of destructiveness is mostly 
realistic, ensuring the absence of Westernized humans except in transient form 
may often be, as Birch says, the best we can do for the time being to ensure the 
presence of nature.  But we should not so circumscribe our concepts that we 
define nature as human absence, for to do so is to make any alternative to our 
present oppositional condition unthinkable.242 
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The positive conception of wilderness, here explicated as the systemic or holistic 
flourishing of natural purposes in the landscape, thus provides a reasonable 
interpretation of the Wilderness Act and a cogent reading of the preservation tradition. 
 So far I have not attempted to demonstrate why wilderness is of value or why one 
should care about the flourishing of natural purposes.  Rather, my project has been to 
explicate a coherent, and I hope compelling, version of a substantial cultural tradition, 
which clearly does value and care about these things.  It is appropriate at this point, 
however, to offer some reasons as to why the flourishing of natural purposes is a 
sensible thing to value.  I hope in these comments, not to establish deductively the moral 
significance of natural purpose, but to render its value a live option for those who have 
either not previously embraced the wilderness tradition or who have embraced it as 
interpreted under the negative conception.  
 The flourishing of natural purposes is a rich enough notion to be valued in a 
number of ways, and indeed a great number of reasons for valuing wilderness have been 
put forward.  Wilderness is valuable instrumentally for diverse anthropocentric reasons. 
Advocates have argued persuasively for a large number of such reasons, from the 
economic importance of ecosystem functions to the desirability of satisfying the broadest 
range of recreational preferences. Many of the reasons are serious and persuasive, and 
they alone justify a stronger preservation policy than is presently in effect.  But to value 
wilderness only for these reasons would mean missing the heart of the wilderness 
preservation tradition.   
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 Another and richer way to value flourishing natural purpose is to consider not 
only its benefits to people but to all sentient creatures.  This is would be the way of the 
enduring ethical tradition of utilitarianism.  This approach keeps all the arguments of 
enlightened anthropocentrism and adds an additional set of reasons to the balance.  The 
further advantage of wilderness on this perspective is that it provides for sustained and 
large populations of sentient organisms living in the environment to which they are most 
suited.  A reasonable argument may be made that failure to express their biological 
functions will often be accompanied by suffering in sentient organisms.  Proper bodily 
function is generally supportive of mental well-being.  And behavioral drives will 
normally be adapted in harmony with the physiological adaptations, such that frustration 
of the physiological adaptations will often have psychological effects.  Rollin, in 
describing the animal welfare movement, makes this point about animals used in 
agriculture: 
The agenda is not, for mainstream society, making animals “equal” to people.  It 
is rather preserving the commonsense insight that “fish gotta swim and birds 
gotta fly,” and suffer if they don’t. … It is not against animal use; it is opposed to 
animal use that goes against the animals’ natures and tries to force square pegs 
into round holes, leading to friction and suffering.243 
Flourishing of natural purpose should thus be a rough guide to the psychological well-
being of the sentient organisms who embody those purposes.  There is suffering and 
death in the wilderness, but it is often overstated.  Even most predation events are quick 
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and numbed by adrenaline.  Farms may be able to hold larger numbers of certain sentient 
organisms, but pushing this number requires conditions at odds to their natures and thus 
more suffering.  In the wilderness animals are packed in at a diversity of scales, taking 
advantage of every available niche.  And each organism is well adapted to the niche it 
inhabits.  The wilderness is valuable on sentientist grounds as the best available habitat 
for large numbers of sentient organisms. 
 In many of the figures in the wilderness tradition, however, is found a more 
radical approach.  The value of flourishing natural purpose is grounded in the value of 
life, that is, it is valued biocentrically.  This is the approach I wish to defend here.244  
That life itself matters, that it is of intrinsic worth, is a thesis frequently advanced or 
supposed in the writings of the naturalists and wilderness thinkers considered in chapters 
two and three.  Thoreau says it most clearly: “Every creature is better alive than dead, 
men and moose and pine-trees, and he who understands it aright will rather preserve its 
life than destroy it.”245  In William Bartram’s introduction to his Travels, he spends 
several pages attempting to blur the distinctions between plant and animal life and 
between animals and people.246  This passage clearly defends the moral nature of animal 
life and strongly hints at the moral significance of plant life.  Muir’s affection for plants 
is palpable, and he attributes significance to even the “smallest transmicroscopic 
creature.”247  “No matter what may be the note which any creature forms in the song of 
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existence,” Muir writes, “it is made first for itself …”248  And continuing to today, 
conservation biologists continue to recognize the “intrinsic value of nonhuman life” as 
part of the normative content of their discipline.249   
 Leopold’s stance on the moral value of life is more difficult to pin down.  This is 
ironic given his frequent pronouncements on the need for a new ethic.  He frequently 
speaks as though life or ecosystems have moral value but then pulls back to 
anthropocentric justifications for these positions.  If people fail to show respect for the 
other organisms and the biotic community, he argues, it will backfire on them.250  
Finding enlightened anthropocentrism sufficient for his cause, Leopold simply “will not 
dispute the point.”251  Perhaps, as a philosophical pragmatist, “he saw that the 
implications of the two converge in practice and that each is equally true in pragmatist 
terms.”252  Or perhaps he embraced a biocentric perspective and was being careful in his 
rhetoric to appeal to the grounds with the broadest appeal, the anthropocentric.  The 
significance that the term biota takes on in his corpus leads me to suspect the latter. 
  But why should one think that life has such moral significance?  Is it not a simple 
violation of the is/ought distinction to attribute moral significance to such a property?  
But what if life is more than a simple descriptive property?  It has proven extraordinarily 
difficult to define descriptively.  The OED is unabashedly circular in its offering, 
defining life, live, alive and animate each in terms of the all the others.  Biology texts are 
more daring, usually giving something like the following: 
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life A state of physical entities that utilize substances derived from outside 
themselves for the purposes of growth, the repair of structure, and the 
maintenance of their functional systems, and that also reproduce.253 
But even this does not really attempt to describe the “state” of life but only to qualify the 
sort of physical entities that can be in it.  Even these qualifying features, such as growing 
and healing, seem only contingently associated with life, not essential to it.  For 
example, this definition has the clumsy consequence that mules, not reproducing, are 
incapable of life. 
 This apparent failure of attempts to give a reductive analysis of life in terms of 
mechanism should not be entirely unexpected.  A basic step in the romantic turn and the 
associated rise of holistic biological inquiry, described in the previous chapters, is the 
rejection of mechanism as an adequate metaphor for nature.  Understanding nature 
instead as essentially organic requires accepting life as basic, known by intuition and not 
further analyzable. And if life is known by intuition, then the question of its moral 
significance can only be decided by appeal to the quality of that intuition. 
 By intuition, I do not mean merely a strong feeling about the matter.  To know 
something by intuition is to grasp directly, to see it by the “immediate apprehension by 
the intellect alone.”254  Think here of Euclid’s axioms.  They are the starting point for 
reasoning about geometry and are not subject to further demonstration. Not everyone 
knows them to be so, but anyone can know them simply by taking them into careful 
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consideration.  This is the paradigm case of intuition in the sense I am using it, when 
something is known to be true in the act of understanding it. I propose that something 
similar happens in the case of life.  To understand life, by the careful consideration of 
living beings, is to see its worth.  Anybody can see this, but not everybody does, either 
because they do not take time to consider the other creatures or because they only 
consider how the creatures might serve their own purposes instead of considering what 
they are in themselves, or for some other reason. 
 Now the naturalists I have considered in chapter three are people who have 
seriously dedicated themselves to the study and contemplation of all living organisms.  
So if a full understanding of life includes appreciation of its moral worth, we would 
expect to find this appreciation strongest among these biologists.255  And so we do.  
When it comes to the meaning of animal and vegetable life, the naturalists are better 
poised than most to, as Thoreau says, “understand it aright.”256  Anyone may see it 
aright, but this requires the attentive study of living organism—it requires thinking like a 
naturalist. 
 And what is this moral understanding of life that they describe?  A living being is 
one of independent purpose, one that exists and acts for its own sake, its own good.  To 
understand a being as alive is thus to understand it as having a good of its own.  Rolston, 
a botanist as well as an environmental philosopher, shares this understanding: “Every 
organism has a good-of-its-own; it defends its kind as a good kind.  To know what a kind 
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is is also to know what a good-of-that-kind is.”257  My own experience as a field 
ecologist is in agreement.  To understand an organism’s embodied purposes is to 
understand what is required for the good, the flourishing, of the organism.  In disclosing 
its teleological nature to the one who inquires of it, the organism presents itself as a 
series of demands, to wit, this is what I need in order to be, this is what it means for me 
to be the kind of organism I am, and as a living organism, it is good that I be. 
 If moral insight accompanies the attentive study of organisms, and the report of 
the naturalists considered is that it does, then that is reason to take seriously the 
biocentric values of ecologists and biologists, especially when they depart from the 
general sentiments of the broader society.  This argument is not merely an appeal to the 
sentiments of some group, such as environmentalists, which has been selected ahead of 
time on the basis of their having those sentiments.  Rather I argue that biocentrism is 
supported by the intuition of ecologists and biologists, those who have engaged in the 
sort of inquiry that can produce the relevant moral insight.  It just so happens that 
ecologists and biologists are a driving and originating force in the environmental 
movement, which is exactly what would be expected if biological inquiry resulted in 
biocentric values. 
 Flourishing natural purpose, at the holistic level of wilderness, is best understood 
as deriving its moral significance from the life of the organisms which embody the 
natural purposes.  Natural purposes gain significance both as the teleological nature of 
the living organism and as functions aimed at the sustenance and propagation of that life.  
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Life is had by individuals, but the individual beings are thoroughly conditioned by the 
larger biotic community or ecosystem in which they subsist. The good of the organism, 
is just that, a good, because the organism lives, but the content of that good is given by 
the organism’s ecological nature.  So life, in giving significance to the organism, gives 
significance to the full reach of its teleological nature.  Life is individual, but the natural 
purposes, which are made significant by life, reach beyond the individual level.  The 
good of the organism is processive and relational; in other words, it is not only an 
individual good but a species good and an ecological good.  Natural purpose, embodied 
in the adaptations of the organism and mediated by its ecological relations, bridges the 
gap from individual to holistic value.  The flourishing of the wilder, the wild beast, is 
constitutive of wilderness. 
 The biocentric perspective adds new reasons for the preservation of wilderness 
while still keeping the reasons given by the anthropocentric and sentientist perspectives. 
Yet many environmental philosophers have argued that biocentrism does not go far 
enough to justify the environmental project, holding rather that ecosystems must be 
directly morally considerable at the holistic level.  In addition, thinkers including 
Callicott have argued that Leopold provides such an holistic ethic.  Against this, Bryan 
Norton and Gary Varner have argued that Leopold was a practical holist and also for the 
sufficiency of practical holism.258  Varner distinguishes practical holism in this way: 
Ethical holists attribute intrinsic moral value to ecosystems, or biotic 
communities, “as such” rather than (or at least in addition to) their individual 
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members, whereas practical holists hold only that it is necessary, in order to 
effectively manage environmental systems, to view them as complex systems 
that must be managed as wholes.259 
The biocentric defense I have offered above is practically holistic in this sense, which 
some environmentalists may find to be an objection.  But it also gives clear reason why 
value grounded in individual life has holistic implications.  I argue that the good of the 
individual living organism is inseparable from the good of the ecosystem.  My defense 
of a positive conception of wilderness as flourishing natural purpose would, I believe, be 
compatible with any holistic environmental ethic, but I do not see how or why I should 
argue for that.  Surely system is not a morally laden notion.  Understanding system does 
not push one beyond the reach of mechanistic understanding.  Except for the life of the 
members, I suspect that no one would value the system as such.  It is because the 
members live that it is a community and not merely a system. 
 A supporting consideration for valuing the flourishing of natural purpose is the 
relationship between human flourishing and the flourishing of other animals.  Human 
flourishing, which most consider to be of high moral significance, is in fact a special 
instance of animal flourishing.  First, we consider even our biological functions and 
purposes that are shared with plants and animals to be important: strength, health, 
appetite, longevity and procreation among others.  The advanced intelligence, language 
and culture that distinguish humanity, which allow for our conscious purposes, are also 
biological traits with natural purposes.  Culture and language have the natural purpose of 
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the flourishing and perpetuation of Homo sapiens.  Not only the faculties, but also the 
specific content, albeit consciously formed, can over the long term be subject to natural 
selection and thus serve natural purposes.  Cultural practices and traditions can be 
adaptations, part of the fabric of ecosystems.  Our cultural and conscious purposes are 
embedded in a larger teleological context.  Caring about natural purpose in animals and 
plants is thus in consonance with caring about cultural purposes and to a greater degree 
than most would realize.   
 A recent commentator on Aristotle’s version of natural teleology reflects on this 
point: 
 Observing the world from Aristotle’s perspective can be humbling 
because, while offering numerous opportunities for the celebration of human 
uniqueness and magnificence, it at the same time forces us to recognize the great 
extent to which we, as natural creatures, are animals and, indeed, plants.260  What 
constitutes the good life for us can be determined by a process parallel to the 
determination of what is good for any organism, and a not negligible part of our 
good life just is a flourishing of our plant and animal nature.  . . . To consider the 
contemplation of any organism to be disgusting because unsightly implies a low 
estimation of oneself, since humans are composed in a similar way: ‘if someone 
has considered the contemplation of other animals to lack value, he ought to 
think the same about himself as well’ (PA i 5, 645A26-8).261 
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Even the rational soul, by which Aristotle distinguishes humans, is enriched by the 
recognition of other natural purposes.  Not only is reason grounded in natural purposes, 
but it culminates in returning to them: 
If practical wisdom was all there was to wisdom, and contemplation had no other 
or no greater object than human good, then other natural things, like plants and 
animals, could justifiably be viewed solely as instruments for human ends.  But 
as it is, the framework of practical reason is subordinate to theoretical wisdom.  
… Contemplation is of natures, not of tools.  Any further use or benefit that can 
be had from natures is incidental to the theoretical knowledge of which they are 
the objects—these are ends to themselves.262 
The suggestion here is that, in addition to plants and animals having a good of their own, 
analogous to our human good of our own, they are the proper objects of the highest 
human good, namely contemplation.  The naturalist’s science is among the highest forms 
of cultural flourishing for Aristotle.  Rolston has made the similar suggestion that at least 
part of the significance of humans is as nature’s storytellers, by which he means telling 
the story of nature, doing natural history.  Enjoying diverse natural things is “a condition 
of human flourishing,” he maintains, and “an interest in natural history ennobles 
persons.”263  Given such thick relations between the spheres of natural and cultural 
purposes, it should not be difficult to extend the recognition of value across the 
boundaries. 
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 I am not suggesting that flourishing natural purpose is the normative concept, a 
principle to ground all of ethics.   Nor is it even the only environmentally relevant moral 
principle.  Some criticism of the wilderness tradition seems based on the faulty premise 
that if we value wilderness then we must only value wilderness.  Thus, Cronon faults 
radical environmentalists for excluding from their agenda “problems of occupational 
health and safety in industrial settings” and other issues of environmental justice.264  
That some genuine issues are not supported by an appeal to wilderness is no objection to 
the value of wilderness.  For instance, principles of distributive justice, which are 
necessary for the much needed environmental justice movement, should not be expected 
to reduce to the same principles that motivate wilderness preservation.  Ethics will never 
be satisfactorily reduced to a single principle.  The character of moral experience is too 
thick and open to be treated so reductively.  A full defense of moral pluralism would 
take us too far a field from the present project but is of great importance for a 
satisfyingly rich environmental ethics.  Probably no moral philosophy could function 
properly if actually restricted to any single principle, without at least some 
supplementary principles to guide its application.265   
 Wilderness preservation and restoration must be worked alongside and in 
creative tension with other obligations, values and morally laden projects.  In defending 
wilderness I do not suggest that designated protected areas will solve all environmental 
problems or even that protected areas are always appropriate.  Removing native peoples, 
which often happens when areas are ‘protected,’ clearly relies on a negative conception 
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of wilderness and is almost never helpful.  Wilderness preservation is not a trump card.  
Indigenous rights, sustainable development, human and animal welfare, individual 
liberty and distributive justice may at times be set in intractable tension with wilderness 
preservation and should sometimes prevail.  But generally the diversity of life and the 
integrity of ecosystems which constitute wilderness will serve, beyond their intrinsic 
worth, to enrich human life and the sustainability of economic and cultural projects.  
Certainly a dysfunctional ecosystem is not a promising place to find and sustain a niche. 
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CHAPTER V 
MANAGEMENT AND RESTORATION 
 
In reclaiming and reoccupying lands laid waste by human improvidence or 
malice … the task is to become a co-worker with nature in the reconstruction of 
the damaged fabric.  
George Perkins Marsh, Man and Nature (1864) 266 
 
 The negative conception of wilderness has given rise to serious conceptual 
difficulties around the practices of wilderness management and ecological restoration.  
These practices are well developed and on the surface seem to be clearly helpful 
activities.  Under the usual, negative interpretation of wilderness, however, they are 
unthinkable.  They are performative contradictions.    If wilderness is land which is not 
shaped or created by people, then people clearly cannot shape or create wildernesses.  
Oddly enough, many who hold strongly to the negative conception are more than happy 
to encourage the actual practices of wilderness management and restoration, despite the 
difficulties in speaking about them.  But because of these difficulties, some philosophers 
have been decidedly unhelpful in their counsel.  Nash, for instance, writes in a textbook 
for wilderness managers that true wilderness is not influenced by people at all, and that 
the wilderness itself, as opposed to the visitors, does not really need management.267  
This advice, while well intentioned, is entirely inadequate to the task these managers are 
entrusted with and may even cause them some philosophical paralysis as they face the 
real problems of wilderness management.  And until recently the only philosophical 
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literature on ecological restoration was decidedly hostile, comparing restoration to art 
forgery.268  This has had something of an alienating effect between the restoration 
community and environmental ethicists.269 
 The practices of wilderness management and ecological restoration are clearly 
distinct from anything one would normally call cultivation or development. They break 
the old categories, and they are too important to leave unexamined.  Indeed the 
legitimacy, potential and limitation of these practices are critical issues for 
understanding and meliorating the ecological crisis.  Understanding their legitimacy is 
certainly important for the application of the Wilderness Act.270  If we have gone too far 
in our destruction of nature—and clearly we have—then hope and possibility rides on 
ecological restoration, which may be understood as the physician’s art.  But for there to 
be a physician, there must be a patient.  A positive conception of wilderness, as land 
characterized by the flourishing of natural purposes, allows for a richer array of 
possibilities in our relationship to wilderness, than does the negative conception.  It 
allows for the possibility that human action may, to a limited degree, work in 
cooperation with and even restore such flourishing. 
 I shall consider first the practice of wilderness management, being in some 
aspects the easier case.  The idea of wilderness management strikes many people as 
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oxymoronic, and there is no denying that it involves some cognitive tension.  If 
wilderness is essentially constituted by its lack of human influence, as many understand 
it, then wilderness management can not be real.  There can be no management without 
influence.  Having an effect is essential to the idea of managing, and, in being affected 
by the presumably human managers, the managed wilderness would cease to be 
wilderness.  Wilderness management is an oxymoron, a contradiction.  Under the 
negative conception of wilderness, wilderness management is prima facie impossible.   
 But wilderness management is an established discipline with professionals, 
textbooks271 and academic conferences.  What are all these professional wilderness 
managers doing?  If Nash’s interpretation of wilderness is correct, then either they are 
doing nothing, and the profession is a ruse, or they are doing something else, like 
managing visitors, or they diminish the wilderness quality of the land in the act of 
management.  A regular interpretation, and the one offered by Nash, is that wilderness 
management is in part something else, the management of people, and in part a tragic but 
necessary diminishment of the wilderness.  The wilderness is essentially compromised 
by management in order to save it from total destruction. 
  I am going to argue something else: that since wilderness is something other and 
more than the lack of human influence, human influence might not always destroy this 
something else, and thus that wilderness management is possible.  I do not claim that 
everything is rosy, that farms are really wildernesses if you look at them rightly, or that I 
have a formula that will solve all management dilemmas.  Rather I offer that a more 
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substantive account of what wilderness is, and not just what it is not, helps us to better 
understand what we are doing in wilderness management and why.  If our purpose in 
management is to keep the natural purposes flourishing rather than restructuring the land 
and its biotic community for our use, then we are managing for wilderness. 
 Wilderness management does involve loss and change, but it is not the loss of the 
wilderness itself.  It is the loss of the possibility of a particular way of relating to it and 
being in it.  In the presence of management, there is a changed quality of wilderness 
experience.  The freedom of the pioneer is exchanged for a hiking permit.  Yet even this 
loss is ameliorable to a degree.   
 Changed also is the meaning of wilderness to society: It exists at our permission 
rather than being a limit to our reach.  Two centuries ago, wilderness was wherever 
Western civilization had not yet established itself.  It was the land beyond the reach of 
the lawman.  Today, wilderness is enforced by the lawman.  Wilderness areas are 
wherever we let them be.  That is to say, all the North American wilderness is under 
some degree of human management now. 
 The earliest history of wilderness management is mostly the history of game 
management.  From ancient times people have found, or speculated, that their 
interventions in wild lands might increase the abundance of game.  Native Americans in 
many areas frequently burned the land to maintain grassland, preventing succession to 
forest.  This resulted in more forage for game animals and an easier time hunting them.  
The Mosaic Law of the ancient Hebrews has provisions which appear to be for the 
maintenance of wildlife populations: “If you come across a bird’s nest in any tree or on 
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the ground, with young ones or eggs and the mother sitting on the young or on the eggs, 
you shall not take the mother with the young.”272  In 256 BC King Ashoka (Piyadasi) of 
India issued an edict regarding the protection especially of non-game animals:  
Twenty-six years after my coronation various animals were declared to be 
protected—parrots, mainas, ruddy geese, wild ducks, bats, queen ants, terrapins, 
boneless fish, fish, tortoises, porcupines, squirrels, deer, bulls, wild asses, wild 
pigeons, domestic pigeons and all four-footed creatures that are neither useful 
nor edible...273 
Marco Polo recounts Kublai Khan’s advanced management practices in “The Great 
Khan”: 
There is an order which prohibits every person throughout all countries subject to 
the Great Khan, from daring to kill hares, roebucks, fallow deer, stags, or other 
animals of that kind, or any large birds, between the months of March and 
October.  This is that they may increase and multiply; and as the breach of this 
order is attended with punishment, game of every description increases 
prodigiously.274 
The Khan’s program also included areas specifically managed as habitat for game birds, 
meeting their needs for shelter and food.  This system is remarkably similar to the 
present strategies of fish and game departments across the United States.  Aldo Leopold 
comments on the significance of this: 
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This is the earliest known instance of food and cover control combined with 
restrictions on hunting.  Its completeness implies a long previous course of 
evolution.  Although now six centuries old, it sets a pace in management 
technique which our most modern state would be hard pressed to follow.  
Kublai’s ideas of democracy in sport are of course another matter.275  
Sophisticated measures of game management were also practiced in medieval Europe, 
with similar failings of democracy.  Forest was a legal designation, applied extensively, 
in medieval Europe by which the aristocracy dedicated areas for their own exclusive use 
as hunting grounds. 
The forest was the most hated aspect of royal authority throughout western 
Europe, with forest law especially oppressive in France.  French courts dealt 
brutally with peasants who shot pigeons that fed on their newly planted fields or 
killed boar and deer that ate grain ready for harvest.  Game wardens prohibited 
weeding and mowing before 24 June so as not to disturb nesting game birds.  
Peasants were also forbidden to remove stubble before 1 October as this provided 
vital cover for quail and partridge.276 
 Leopold claims that the development of game management has usually followed 
a progression of control mechanisms, which he lists as follows: 
1. Restriction on hunting. 
2. Predator control. 
3. Reservation of game lands (as parks, forests, refuges, etc.). 
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4. Artificial replenishment (restocking and game farming). 
5. Environmental controls (control of food, cover, special factors, and 
disease.)277 
Negative controls, such as restrictions on hunting, appear first, and positive controls, 
such as restocking or treating disease, appear later.  Some of these methods are more 
effective than others, and some, notably predator control, are simply misguided in most 
circumstances.  Modern game management in America has become a uniquely scientific 
and political affair.  A large and growing body of research supports extensive 
management practices on both public and private lands.  Wildlife is understood as held 
in public trust, and a hunting license is available to anyone for a nominal fee.  The 
remarkably democratic nature of game management in America was highlighted to me 
this morning when I found political commentary in my local paper in Texas on 
controversial decisions about predators in Wyoming.278  The wolves, having been 
reintroduced and carefully protected, are no longer considered endangered, but some see 
this triumph only as an opportunity to once more exterminate them from many areas. 
 Game management and wilderness management are not exactly the same thing.  
Game management can be practiced on land that is clearly not wilderness, and 
wilderness management may include the prohibition of hunting.  I include the discussion 
of game management for two reasons: First, I have argued for a tight relationship 
between the idea of wilderness and the presence of wild animals; Second, Aldo Leopold, 
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who put game management on a scientific foundation, had much more in his sights than 
improving hunting.   He sought to build a practice that would be subversive of traditional 
‘development,’ which would work for the flourishing of wildness to some degree across 
a variety of landscapes.  Leopold saw that, properly construed, game management must 
aim at the health of the biotic community, blurring the distinction between game and 
non-game animals.  And the reverse holds for wilderness managers per se: managing the 
community of life involves managing the game animals. 
 The development of wilderness management as such, practices aimed at 
managing land to be wilderness rather than managing wilderness to produce more game, 
followed the actual preservation of wilderness areas, first in National Parks and then 
through the Wilderness Act.   Wilderness designation was soon found to be insufficient, 
if the areas were allowed to be abused.  Continually increasing recreational use of 
preserved areas was quickly becoming more than the land could tolerate.  An important 
step was taken very early, in 1937, when Robert Marshall, then working for the Forest 
Service, was hiking with a group from the Sierra Club.  “On the trip the party visited 
high country severely damaged by the grazing of packstock and by campers.”279  The 
following discussion resulted in Marshall asking the president of the Sierra Club to form 
a committee to advise the forest service on issues of wilderness management.  Over the 
next few decades, more and more discussion and energy went into issues of 
management, instead of simply designation.  At first, the response was to develop the 
National Parks so they could handle more visitors.  Roads, motels, latrines, picnic tables 
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and other facilities were built.  Such amenities, while enabling more access to scenic 
views, were found to be antithetical to the character of wilderness experience.  In 1973 
permits were first used to limit the number of visitors to some wilderness areas.280  Rules 
and regulations multiplied on what campers were allowed to do in various areas, from 
forgoing campfires to packing out their own waste.  The leveling off of the numbers of 
wilderness users and the success of educational programs in minimum impact camping 
soon allowed a shift to a lighter-handed management of visitors.  Eagle Cap Wilderness, 
for instance, was able to drop its permit system in 1983.281   
 Much of this sort of wilderness management could easily be understood as 
people management.  This might be tolerable to the holder of the negative conception of 
wilderness, for the acts of management are basically acts of exclusion.  “In this regard, it 
is relevant to remember it is not wilderness that really needs management,” writes Nash 
in his contribution to Wilderness Management, “it is people.  Thus … wilderness 
management is largely people management.”282  Management by exclusion can account 
for visitor restrictions, restrictions on development, like road construction, and 
restrictions on extractive industry, like timber harvest.  Still, the absence of these banned 
activities and of the surplus recreators is now a human influence.  It is in some sense an 
artificial absence of human influence. 
 But wilderness management involves much more than measures of exclusion.  
Most wilderness areas are affected by histories of fire suppression and predator 
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extermination as well as ongoing influences from activities on neighboring land.  
Because of these influences and the limited size and sometimes arbitrary boundaries of 
preserved areas, maintaining the native species and ecosystems, the “natural conditions” 
of the Wilderness Act, requires a good deal of game management and other creative 
activities.  It is these activities that give the negative conception so much trouble.   
 The difficulties may be softened by understanding wilderness in terms of 
degrees, that is, management may make an area less of a wilderness without destroying 
its wilderness character all together.  Brigantine Wilderness, a marsh important to 
migratory waterfowl next to Atlantic City, New Jersey, has often been sprayed by 
aircraft for mosquitoes.283  Due to human health concerns, this is a compromise that 
enables the marsh not to be drained.  Various measures of protective management may 
be justified this way, as the lesser of two human influences.  Without protective 
management, wilderness areas would be influenced in much more trammeling and 
noticeable ways.   
 Other forms of protective management are a little more problematic, such as the 
removal of exotic species.  Here the direct objects of management activities are not 
people, but wild or feral plants and animals.  Determining which wild animals constitute 
the “natural conditions” for an area can be problematic.  Mangers feel justified in 
exterminating some of these species, because they would not have been there had it not 
been for human influence.  But, notwithstanding that the introduction of these species 
was a matter of human influence, their removal is also a direct human influence upon the 
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“community of life.”  If human influence per se is the problem, than the removal is just 
one more problem.   
 Wilderness management, as it is practiced today, includes significantly more than 
such protection.  There are also works of maintenance and restoration.  The lake and its 
water quality in Big Lake Wilderness in Arkansas are “now maintained by manmade 
levees, channels and control structures.”284  Presumably this water maintenance 
simulates the natural water flow as it was before there was human influence upstream.  
The Okefenokee Wilderness in Georgia, among other places, is deliberately burned “to 
perpetuate open wet prairies which have historically been maintained by fires.”285  These 
works of people leave quite an “imprint “and are certainly not “unnoticeable.”  The goal 
may still be seen as the mitigation of human influence coming indirectly and from a 
distance, but it is now clearly the land and its biota that are being managed.  The 
management is laborious and intensive, and even, in the case of Big Lake, mechanical.  
This is not the management of people only, nor is it some small influence such that we 
might save the wilderness as nearly uninfluenced.  Yet this permeating and substantial 
management, this human influence, seems right and is generally agreed upon for these 
wildernesses, as wildernesses. 
 Consider now the reintroduction of wolves into wilderness in Yellowstone 
National Park and central Idaho.  More than maintenance, this was an act of wilderness 
restoration.  Yellowstone in its primeval character had wolves.  They were exterminated 
by people in recent history, so the goal may be interpreted as undoing the human 
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influence of the past.  But the act was deliberate and the influence great.  Here is a 
human act by which a land became more of a wilderness than it was before.  I maintain 
that this human touch upon the “earth and its community of life” increased the 
wilderness character of the region.  For a human touch to make a place more of a 
wilderness than it was before would be an inexplicable puzzle given the negative 
interpretation of wilderness.  It is impossible that the direct affect a human influence be 
that the object of the influence is less influenced. If influence per se is the contaminant, 
then there can be no sense in distinguishing more or less trammeling kinds of influence. 
 With the positive understanding of wilderness, however, as the flourishing of 
natural purposes, the possibility of managing for wilderness emerges.  Managed 
wilderness is still wilderness if the management is the affirmation or protection of the 
natural purposes and not the imposition of our own interests.  It may be objected that any 
action taken in the management of wilderness must, as a human action, represent some 
human purpose.  Of course, but we may take as our purpose the flourishing of natural 
purpose.  There may be many reasons for people to desire that the natural purposes 
flourish—reasons of morality, aesthetics, religion or even economics.  But the presence 
of human purpose is not a problem for wilderness, unless the fulfillment of that human 
purpose involves a trammeling of natural purposes. 
 There is no contradiction in designating wilderness areas for the enjoyment of the 
American people, so long as that enjoyment takes a form that is not disruptive of natural 
purposes in the landscape.  Limiting the numbers of recreators and educating them in 
minimum impact camping is managing for wilderness because it mitigates the extent that 
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human presence in the wilderness thwarts, trammels or endangers this natural 
flourishing.  The removal of exotic species can be justified, not a priori, but on a per 
case basis, by seeing whether there are particular natural purposes, such as the 
persistence of native species, that are threatened by the new arrival.  Similarly water and 
fire management can be justified by seeing whether native species are adapted to and 
dependent on predevelopment conditions and whether those conditions can be restored 
through water works or controlled burns.  With predator reintroduction, the case is very 
clear.  Not only does the management enable the recovery of those natural purposes 
dependent on the predator, which have been shown to be extensive, it puts back a major 
instance of the natural purposes themselves.  Indeed, predator restoration is just putting 
back the wildeor, the untamed beast, the very essence of wilderness.  How could 
restoring the wildeor not increase wilderness character? 
 In light of the positive conception of wilderness, as flourishing natural purpose, 
the wilderness manager is not confronted with the contradictory task of acting so as to 
erase his or her action, but with the intelligible if difficult task of acting to protect and 
preserve the natural purposes embodied in the wilderness area. 
 And yet there is often a loss in the management of wilderness, a tragic 
diminishment.  Not least of all is the problem of mismanagement, of failure to 
understand the complex dynamics and thus causing harm despite our intentions.  While 
allowing that human activity may be beneficial to wilderness character, I must 
emphasize the danger of hubris and lack of care in such activities.  It is abundantly clear 
that human activity, even when well-intentioned, very often degrades wilderness.  
 119 
Sometimes the failure of management is political, permitting behavior and activities in 
the wilderness areas that are known to be heavily trammeling of wilderness character, 
such as grazing sheep and cattle.  Sometimes managers must suppress natural purposes 
or processes that could cause harm beyond the boundaries of the wilderness area, as with 
the spraying of mosquitoes in Brigantine Wilderness.   
 Another loss comes not so much to the wilderness itself but to our possibilities of 
relating to it.  First, the cultural meaning of the wilderness is different.  Philip Cafaro 
points out that “there is a sense in which even the forests of our most remote, unmanaged 
wilderness areas are enclosed within artificial boundaries; this change, from de facto 
wilderness to wild only at the mercy of human beings, is important.”286  The wilderness 
stands no longer as a symbol of individual liberty and the chance to make it on one’s 
own.  It is not the edge of our reach, the chaos beyond.  It now stands for our restraint, 
for our charity toward our mythological mother earth and her other children. 
 Second, we enter the wilderness as heavily managed. Not only can we not carve 
out a homestead and a new life from scratch in the wilderness, we frequently can not 
even walk around in it without filing a hiking itinerary with the appropriate authorities.  
Jack Turner, in his recent book The Abstract Wild, describes this trouble with no small 
amount of frustration: 
Our movements [in national parks] are always subjected to what Foucault calls 
‘normalizing surveillance.’ There are traffic police, climbing police, river police, 
and backcountry police. They carry guns and Mace, wear bullet-proof vests, and 
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levy fines.  It is illegal to wander around the national parks without a permit 
defining where you go and where you stay and how long you stay.  In every 
manner conceivable, national parks separate us from the freedom that is the 
promise of the wild.287 
 His avowed concern in this book is not to defend wild nature so much as to defend “the 
authority of its presence in our experience and, hence, in the structure of our lives.”288  
The importance of wilderness in human experience is an issue that runs deep in the 
history of the wilderness idea in America, from the writings of Henry David Thoreau to 
John Muir and Theodore Roosevelt.  This aspect of wilderness, the quality of wilderness 
experience, is more difficult to manage without trammeling.  Some amelioration, at 
least, has been accomplished in the recent trend from heavy-handed permitting and 
regulating to a lighter-handed emphasis on visitor education. 
 What really may be lost for the foreseeable future in North America is the 
possibility of relating to wilderness as belonging to it.  Homo sapiens is a natural species 
embodying natural as well as adopting cultural purposes.289  The conceptual possibility 
of wilderness people would be another discussion, but would also hinge on rejecting the 
dualist account of wilderness as the absence of people.  Gary Snyder reminds us that 
“there has been no wilderness without some kind of human presence for several hundred 
thousand years.”290  Yet our ecological relations, our place in the food web, for instance, 
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are now so mediated by mechanical industry that it is nearly impossible to trace out the 
consequences of our behavior and consumption patterns on the land and its biotic 
community.  Many of us long for healthier relations to the land as we imagine were had 
by the indigenous peoples who were here before us.  The option of a purely primitive 
way of relating to or experiencing wilderness is probably lost, but much can be done for 
improving our actual relations to the land and to wild nature generally.  As Leopold said, 
our present task is one “of mixing a degree of wildness with utility.”291  The preservation 
and management of the remaining genuinely wild landscapes is an important part of this 
task. 
 Another part of this task is the restoring of damaged lands. The practice of 
ecological restoration goes much further than wilderness management and seeks to 
restore the flourishing of nature in places where it has been severely compromised or 
altogether ceased.  Some of what I have described as management overlaps with 
restoration, such as predator reintroduction.  Many restoration projects are actually 
underway within protected wildernesses, as part of their management.292  But restoration 
is equally possible on a stream through a city slum.  With respect to the topic of 
wilderness, the interesting question here is to what degree restored ecosystems can 
approach the status of wilderness.  In blunter words, to what extent can a wilderness be 
built? 
 Ecological restoration has substantial controversy around it, similar to wilderness 
management.  Many environmental philosophers have been quite hostile to the idea.  It 
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is thought to perpetuate an arrogant culture of technological mastery over nature.  Some, 
such as Robert Elliot and Eric Katz, claim that what is produced is not nature but a 
cultural artifact of much less value.  Restoration is really just “faking nature.”293 The 
claim to restorative powers, the supposed ability to put things back, has in fact been used 
to justify the destruction of some of our most beautiful landscapes.294  Other issues dog 
attempts to work out the details, such as the question of how to determine the goal: since 
a landscape changes over time, ‘when’ should it be restored to?  Is a historical condition 
the goal, or some amount of ecosystem function?   
 Many of the difficulties around restoration are due to the assumption of a polar 
dualism between nature and culture.  If nature is the absence of human activity, then 
humans can not participate in nature’s workings.  But if we have a positive 
understanding of nature’s purposes, then there is no conceptual reason people could not 
work in cooperation with them.  Indeed I argue, given the understanding of wilderness as 
a place characterized by the flourishing of natural purposes, that ecological restoration 
can in fact rebuild wilderness.  A restored wilderness will be different in significant 
respects from one that was never trammeled or destroyed, but it could qualify as a 
wilderness.  This possibility does not license the destruction of wilderness anymore than 
the existence of physicians justifies the injuring of people. 
 The history of ecological restoration is not so old as the history of wilderness and 
game management.  No doubt ancient precursors exist, and much historical work 
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remains to be done in this respect, but the practice is essentially new.295  The earliest 
major forbearer of the field in America is Frederick Olmsted, and only a few recognize 
him as such.  Most point to “the experiments conducted by Aldo Leopold and his 
colleagues at the University of Wisconsin’s Arboretum in Madison in the 1930s.”296  
Many important and path-breaking steps were taken at Madison, but to begin the story 
there would leave out too much of importance. 
 Frederick Law Olmsted, the founder of landscape architecture, made a career of 
building and managing natural scenery.  He believed that exposure to beautiful, natural 
landscapes was vitally important to the psychological health of people, and was 
relentless in his commitment to make it available to every American.  The best 
landscapes in America, unlike Europe, would not become the private domain of the 
wealthy few.  This commitment had at least two expressions in his work: involvement in 
wilderness preservation and developing urban parks. 
 Olmsted was intimately involved in the planning of Yosemite as a Park.  After it 
was designated in 1864, he was asked to chair the commission on what to do with it.297  
Another major influence on the course of wilderness preservation was his mentoring of 
Gifford Pinchot, the pioneering conservationist and first Chief Forester.  But it is 
Olmsted’s penchant for building ‘natural’ places that is of interest here.  Central Park, in 
New York City, was “created from bedrock; all the rivers, ponds, and wooded areas 
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were engineered.”298 Around Niagara Falls, he removed buildings, re-channeled the river 
back into a meandering path and planted native riparian vegetation, providing a frame of 
natural scenery for the falls.299  At Biltmore, he created a forest “out of whole cloth,” 
which is now part of Pisgah National Forest.300  In Boston, he turned polluted mud flats 
into beautiful scenery and functioning ecosystems.  
 Boston’s Fens and Riverway were built over nearly two decades (1880s-1890s) 
as an urban “wilderness,” the first attempt anywhere, so far as I know, to 
construct a wetland.301   
 Many do not consider Olmsted to be in the tradition of restoration ecology, 
because he was not aiming to restore the historical condition of the landscape.302  But he 
has much in common with contemporary restoration.  The actual work of building 
ecosystems is much the same whether the goal is set by reference to historical conditions 
or generalizations from other wild landscapes—digging, planting, replanting, long term 
monitoring and guiding through stages of succession, for instance.  He understood 
landscape process and aimed, like restorationists, for both aesthetic and functional 
results.  Anne Spirn finds in his legacy a compelling answer to the 
preservationist/conservationist split:  
Olmsted represented a middle ground—which eroded in the twentieth century—
between John Muir’s idea of nature as “temple” and Gifford Pinchot’s idea of 
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nature as “workshop.” … Olmsted could reconcile reverence and use, and he did 
this through art.303 
 A recent commentator has suggested that no one goal is definitive of ecological 
restoration, but that there are “three major themes—the restoration of species, the 
restoration of whole ecosystems or landscapes, and the restoration of ecosystem 
services.”304  Olmsted was clearly involved in two out of three of these.  I find Olmsted 
to be significant forerunner of ecological restoration, because he worked with natural 
processes to achieve an end that was not (entirely) of his own invention but was largely 
set by nature.  He worked to enable the flourishing of natural purpose.  “His landscapes 
were constructed,” writes Spirn, “by human imagination, human labor, and processes of 
nonhuman nature.”305 
 Most ecological restorationists look to Madison, Wisconsin, during the great 
depression, for the birth of their discipline.306  And there is no denying that the 
Arboretum at the University of Wisconsin – Madison has played a central role in the 
development of the science of restoration ecology.  It still houses “the oldest and most 
varied collection of restored ecological communities in the world, including tallgrass 
prairies, savannas, several forest types and wetlands.”307  Many of the restoration 
projects were begun with Civilian Conservation Corps crews, which were stationed at 
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the Arboretum from 1935 to 1941.308  The overriding concern at the time was the 
possibility of prairie restoration in the aftermath of the dustbowls. 
 Aldo Leopold was involved in the early experiments, and he spoke at the 
dedication of the Arboretum in 1934: 
This Arboretum may be regarded as a place where, in the course of time, we will 
build up an exhibit of what was, as well as an exhibit of what ought to be.  It is 
with this dim vision of its future destiny that we have dedicated the greater part 
of the Arboretum to a reconstruction of original Wisconsin, rather than to a 
“collection” of imported trees. 
Several scientists who would play substantial roles in the development of the field began 
there.  The first restoration journal began out of the Arboretum in 1983, Restoration and 
Management Notes, later to become Restoration Ecology.309  And it was the first home 
of the now international Society for Ecological Restoration, founded in 1987.310 
 Since the 1980s the field of restoration ecology has exploded in terms of numbers 
of projects and practitioners.  Some projects are worked by professional scientists with 
government or corporate funding, others are entirely amateur and volunteer affairs and 
many are some mix of these.  Most projects concern a fairly small area, but a few are 
very large indeed. 
 The Kissimmee River Restoration in Florida is the largest ecological restoration 
to date, and it merits consideration as an important example.  A large, meandering river, 
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the Kissimmee had an unusually large flood plain and “prolonged periods of 
inundation.”311  After extensive flooding in the late 1940s, plans were made for 
extensive flood control mechanisms.  Through the 1960s, the Army Corps of Engineers 
worked to channel the river into a series of impoundments and canals.  They finished in 
1971, with immediate public backlash for the environmental and recreational losses. 
“35,000 acres of wetland ecosystems [had been] lost or significantly altered.” 312  Water 
quality and ground water levels went down.  Wildlife was disappearing.  There were 
worries about harsher storms and winters without the water and temperature buffer of the 
wetlands.  So the astounding decision was made to try to put it back. 
 In the early nineteen-eighties a small scale demonstration project was undertaken 
to show the feasibility of redirecting the river back into its former meanders, and now 
the Corps of Engineers is well into a half-billion dollar project to undo its own work.  
Begun in earnest in 1998, completion is projected for 2011.  The goals are clearly 
delineated in terms of ecological integrity and natural process: 
The KRR project is intended to restore over 40 square miles of river and 
floodplain ecosystem including 43 miles of meandering river channel and 27,000 
acres of wetlands. Restoration efforts will re-establish an environment conducive 
to the fauna and flora that existed there prior to the channeling efforts in the 
1960s. The following are the Corps's goals and objectives to restore the 
ecological integrity of the damaged ecosystem: 
• re-establish historic hydrologic conditions 
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• recreate the historical river/floodplain connectivity 
• recreate the historic mosaic of wetland plant communities 
• restore the historic biological diversity and functionality313 
So far the project has been incredibly successful.  Water flow was restored in 2001.  
Native plant communities are thriving.  Bird populations are up, and at least eight 
species of shore bird and five species of duck that disappeared from the area have 
returned.  Fish communities have come back substantially as the river has seen a six-fold 
increase in dissolved oxygen, a vital resource for aquatic fauna.  By the end, the 
restoration will include over forty square miles of flood-plain ecosystem and nearly 
20,000 acres of wetlands.314  By restoring the hydrological processes to which the native 
biotic community had adapted, the Corps of Engineers are enabling the wild plants and 
animals to resume their ancient relations and activities.  They are enabling the 
flourishing of the same natural purposes and processes that they had so thoroughly 
trammeled and impounded. 
 Not everyone finds restoration projects as compelling as I do.  Rather than seeing 
hope and possibility, they see self-deception and the same technological hubris that 
caused the trouble in the first place.  Robert Elliot, in “Faking Nature” (1982), offers 
some of the earliest philosophical criticism of restoration ecology.  His main target is the 
pernicious claim of mining companies that they can put things back with ecological 
restoration and should thus be allowed to destroy them as they mine.  The mining 
companies offer what he calls the ‘restoration thesis’: “that the destruction of what has 
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value is compensated for by the later creation (recreation) of something of equal 
value.”315  Elliot’s counter is that what gets put back is not the same, or of as much 
value, as what is lost.  Therefore, the mining companies should not be given a pass on 
these grounds.   
 His suggests that, like an art forgery, a restored landscape might be 
indistinguishable from the original and yet not have the value of the original.  The 
difference is in the origin, no matter how well the restoration is performed.  Something’s 
origin can be deeply relevant to its value, and many value wilderness, at least in part, 
because of the otherness of its origins.  It was incredibly important to John Muir, for 
instance, that Hetch Hetchy was God’s handiwork and not man’s.  In important respects 
then, Elliot claims, restored nature is a fake.  It may deceive us, and it may have real 
values, such as wildlife habitat, but if we know its true history, then we must value it less 
than the pristine. 
 But to what extent are restored landscapes artifacts?  What is contrived and how 
much causal continuity remains?  “If ecological restoration is a material practice, like 
making a piece of art,” asks Andrew Light, “why isn’t it more like art restoration than art 
forgery?”316  The restored ecosystem is in the same place as the damaged one, analogous 
to being on the same canvas.  The restored species are the same, having undiminished 
causal continuity with the historical populations.  They cannot be faked; no restorationist 
ever made a plant or animal from scratch.  Many of the same relations and processes can 
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begin once more.  Natural purposes are enabled to flourish and dominate the landscape 
once more.   
 Another philosophical critic, Eric Katz, has written extensively in the same vein 
as Elliot.  Ecological restoration not only produces fake nature, a “Big Lie” in his words, 
it is just another example of humanity’s arrogant attempts to technologically dominate 
nature.317 “In my view,” Katz writes, “the practice of ecological restoration can only 
represent a misguided faith in the hegemony and infallibility of the human power to 
control the natural world.”318  Restoration is duplicitous, because it passes of a mere 
artifact for nature.  The implication that nature is replaceable undermines the arguments 
for needed preservation.  And all of this contributes to human patterns of arrogant 
domination of the landscape.  For these reasons, Katz is even less willing than Elliot to 
see value in any restoration.319  He does not, like Elliot, limit his critique to those 
pernicious promises of restoration whose intent is to license destruction. 
 Even more so than Elliot, Katz treats a restoration as a whole sale human creation 
and therefore not as nature at all.  A polar dualism between nature and culture is clearly 
at work.  But once more, how much is actually a human product in a given restoration?  
Katz offers us an example: 
Steve Packard’s restoration of the midwest savannah is created by a systematic 
collection of the seeds of wild grasses and the use of controlled burns to prepare 
the land for sowing.  The result is an ecosystem which looks and functions like 
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the original savannah—but it is a system that is a product of human science and 
technology—an artifact.320 
The seeds are naturally given.  Their power to germinate in burned, Midwestern soil is 
naturally given.  The ability of the grasses to grow and flourish in that climate is due to 
the same evolutionary history of adaptation that allows them to flourish in the pristine 
savannah.  The insects and birds which come make their homes in the restored landscape 
were not created in labs.  In the end it is Katz who has an unreasonable faith in 
technology, who thinks that a functioning ecosystem could be a human artifact.  Like 
Locke, he confuses the mixing of labor with wholesale creation.321  The restorationist is 
accused of creating ecosystems ex nihilo. 
 So sharp is Katz’s distinction between people and nature, that the difference 
between a lightening strike and a dropped match is enough to turn a forest into an 
artifact: 
The historical continuity of the changes in an ecosystem determine its authentic 
ontological identity as a natural system.  A forest area is hit by lightening and 
burns.  The forest and the undergrowth return, rejuvenated by the cleansing 
power of the fire.  The new growth maintains a natural historical continuity with 
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the original organisms in the forest before the fire.  These events are totally 
different from a human-induced controlled burn of the forest.322 
 Working, on the contrary, from a positive conception of nature and wilderness, as 
a teleological presence, allows the possibility of working together, in cooperation with or 
on behalf of nature.  Elliot is repulsed by the idea that replacing natural “objects of these 
various kinds,” species and such, could count as the restoration of nature.323  Species 
however are not so many separate objects, but processive and relational beings.  In 
restoration, these processes and relations are not created from scratch.  Rather, the 
necessary conditions are provided for them to resume function and to resume 
maintaining themselves.   
 A medical metaphor is more apt than the formal art metaphor.  When a broken 
bone is set, the body begins its one work at healing, and eventually function is restored.  
Sometimes a cast may be put on for awhile or a screw or pin may be inserted, but the 
patient does not thereby become the doctor’s creation, an artifact.  The idea is absurd.  
So too with restored ecosystems.  Replacing seeds and re-digging the curves of a stream 
are actions like setting bones.  The natural processes then begin their own work of 
healing.  As with a physician or an art restorationist, the goals of the project and the 
designs employed are taken from a careful study of the subject.  The restorationist 
contributes mostly care, attention and labor on behalf of the other.  This interpretation is 
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far from an accusation of hubristic domination.  Rather it highlights, in Light’s words, 
“the possibility of having benevolent restorations.”324 
 Even a project like Olmsted’s work on the Boston Fens and Riverway, where the 
goal was ‘natural’ scenery and functioning ecosystem, but not historical fidelity, cannot 
be reduced to the status of artifact.  Unlike the painter and the sculptor, the landscape 
architect works with in a living medium which is working in its own way.  The restorer 
must work in concert with the ‘materials’ or the project will fail.  Even though Olmsted 
often used non-native species in building the wetland, they were still wild species.325  
The designs for the project were cribbed from nature generally, if not from that 
particular landscape.  When the wetland began to function on its own, it was as a 
community of wild life, flourishing in its own purposes.  Yes, Boston benefited from the 
ecosystem services, the water purification and scenery for instance, but the relationship 
was one of cooperation and not exploitation, where the ecosystems and species were 
treated as ends also and not merely as means.  An ecosystem service has this difference 
from agriculture: an agricultural landscape has been transformed to meet human cultural 
purposes but a wild ecosystem meets our needs either by chance or because we, as 
animals, are adapted to it. 
 The charge may now be answered that ecological restoration enables and excuses 
ecological destruction.  I have defended a strong view of the possibilities of restoration, 
but this does not entail a Pollyanna attitude regarding the effects of destructive 
exploitation.  The possibilities of restoration can and should license some uses of 
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nature—we must use nature to survive—but knowledge of these possibilities should also 
limit our treatment of nature.  Sympathetically with Elliot and Katz, I deny the 
possibility of a technically perfect restoration.  An ecosystem is more complex than we 
can know, and so there will inevitably be more wild purposes and processes in a pristine 
landscape than in a restored one.  Holmes Rolston provides a telling anecdote in this 
regard: 
Once, I was deciding where to hike, looking at trails on either side of the road 
below Independence Pass near Aspen, Colorado.  Reading the trail signs, I found 
that one trail headed into an old-growth forest; the other headed into a forest that 
had been replanted about a half a century before, after logging.  Instantly, I knew 
which trail I wanted to take.  Recent studies in Appalachian forests have found 
that, though the dominant trees may come back, the forest undercover is only 
about one-third as rich as it was before, even where there are some efforts at 
restoration.  I look for rare mosses, and I had considerable doubt that the Forest 
Service restoration team had replanted any undiscovered species of rare mosses!  
Still, I was glad that the forest had been replanted, even though I chose to hike in 
the pristine one.  So the first point to make is that restorations, although valuable, 
are not as valuable as pristine nature, because they are simply not as rich.326 
Rolston comes to the same claims as Elliot about the relative value of prisitine and 
restored nature, but for a very different reason.  Rather than seeing human influence as 
ontologically contaminating, he bases his claim on the obvious limits of our restoration 
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abilities.  Nobody is going to replant all the described species, much less the unknown 
ones.  Rolston compares the landscapes on grounds treatable in terms of flourishing 
natural purposes, namely that not all of them are restored. 
 Another major issue is the enormous expense of doing ecological restoration 
well; the restoration of the Kissimmee is costing far more than the original channeling 
did.  A major lesson from Olmsted and Pinchot’s work at Biltmore for the Vanderbilts 
was that growing and managing a forest must be a public project, for no individual, no 
matter how wealthy, can sustain the cost until it becomes profitable.327  The relevant 
timescale is often measured in generations.  Generally, the cost of restoring an 
ecosystem well will exceed the benefit of any substantially destructive exploitation.  
Preservation and conservation, like preventative medicine, are much easier and cheaper 
than restoration.328 
 Fortunately, not all philosophical commentary on ecological restoration has been 
hostile to the practice.  The passage from Rolston cited above gives a balanced 
assessment.  Light has written a few articles defending restoration’s legitimacy and 
helpfulness.  The philosopher and anthropologist Eric Higgs has now provided a friendly 
and extensive philosophical consideration of ecological restoration in his book Nature by 
Design.  He, like myself, finds the significance of restoration to be hope and possibility.  
Actively involved in restoration work in Jasper National Park in British Columbia and 
Alberta, a protected wilderness, Higgs writes with the advantage firsthand, long-term 
experience in the practice.  Light and Higgs both clearly reject the polar opposition of 
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nature to culture and see nature and wildness in terms of presence.  Light argues for the 
possibility of a benevolent relationship with nature.329  Higgs, like Plumwood, voices the 
need for a reconception of wilderness without the dualism, if environmental progress is 
to be made: 
The challenge is to devise meanings for wilderness, and nature more generally, 
ones that are sufficiently open to salutary human activities, that are mindful of 
the past, and that filter against insidious and destructive patterns and activities.330 
He finds this new meaning in the salutary activity of ecological restoration.  Restoration 
involves human designs upon the landscape, but it is possible to have a “wild design, the 
kind that operates in sympathy with the vitality of life.”331  To have sympathy with 
something requires a positive understanding of it; there can be no sympathy with an 
absence.  And to restore something requires a positive understanding in some depth, and 
understanding of just what the biotic community is up to. 
To restore something means to consider what the thing is and what it means.  
This is perhaps the primary value of restoration, a way of reflecting deeply on 
appropriate action.332 
 So if an ecosystem can be restored in this manner, by careful study and hard 
work, if the historical processes of water and fire can be returned to the land, if native 
plant species can be regrown and native animals released or enticed back, what is 
lacking for this to be a wilderness?  The natural purposes are enabled to flourish once 
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more and to dominate the character of the landscape in their flourishing.  None of the 
restored community of life has been tamed or domesticated.  There are no new 
adaptations which require cultural ends for explanation.  The restorationist, by adopting 
nature’s own ends, makes himself a means.  The historical, natural, wild condition 
determines the restorer’s design, which in turn determines the structure of the restored 
landscape.  Areas, such as Yellowstone, where the land is not extensively developed and 
the restoration consists in reintroducing missing predators are a clear case.  But even a 
forest that has been clear cut or a river that has been channeled has significant potential 
for recovery.  A perfect restoration of all the soil microbes and insects will always be 
beyond the technologically feasible, and an extinct species is gone forever.  But when 
untamed animals and untamed plants are enabled to resume their untamed relations to 
the level of holistic, ecosystem function, then there is, albeit diminished, a wilderness. 
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 CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The North American tradition of wilderness appreciation and preservation is 
neither an historical anomaly nor a pathological self-deception.  It has deep roots in 
religious and philosophical traditions of thinking about nature and in the development of 
natural history and the ecological sciences.  A survey of these roots reveals an 
understanding of wilderness far richer and more sophisticated than that attributed by the 
tradition’s critics.  Wilderness is not the mere absence of human influence, not just a 
name for whatever is not culture.  The major figures in the history of wilderness 
appreciation, the poets, philosophers and especially the naturalists, have all spoken of 
nature as a presence in its own right.  Wilderness is the active product of the strivings of 
nature; it is the emergent coherence of the purposes embodied in wild plants and 
animals.  These wild organisms are not a collection of discrete objects but an assemblage 
of processes and functions embedded in a complex web of relations.  These processes 
and relations form a Heraclitean  λογος  in the flux.  Wilderness is the flourishing of 
natural purpose in an ecological community. 
 By thus considering wilderness in terms of what it is, rather than merely what it 
is not, the conception of wilderness as human absence is rejected.  Human presence and 
influence in nature are therefore no longer condemned a priori.  This approach does not, 
however, undermine the strong practical reasons for limiting the presence and activities 
of people in protected wilderness areas.  Human influence must be judged by 
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considering its actual effects on the land in question and its community of life.  Some 
natural purposes are more easily trammeled than others, and some human behaviors are 
more destructive than others.  Understanding the exclusion of people as a practical 
consideration instead of a conceptual necessity allows for a coherent reading of the 
Wilderness Act.  The idea of wilderness as flourishing natural purpose can help guide us 
both in managing the wilderness that remains, in restoring the wilderness that has been 
degraded and in reforming our relations to wild nature in the places we inhabit and 
cultivate. 
 Natural purposes and emergent ecosystem functions can be studied and 
understood by those who inquire openly and patiently, allowing for the possibility of 
laboring in harmony with the biotic community rather than against it.  The science of 
ecology and her practical children, conservation biology and restoration ecology, are 
vital sources of cultural critique and creative solutions to our pressing environmental 
problems.  The role of the naturalists and ecologists is often underappreciated in the 
story of the American love of wilderness.  But such scientists have been a driving force 
of the conservation movement since it began and continue to play a guiding role.  Their 
version of science as the contemplation and attentive care of wild life stands in stark and 
refreshing contrast to the dominant version of science as the technological manipulation 
of nature in service of industry.  
 Preserving the remaining wilderness in the world is an extraordinarily important 
and timely project.  But this does not mean conservationists should be complicit in the 
oppression of people.  The presence of people in the land should not be considered a 
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priori detrimental to its wilderness value.  And effective preservation requires not 
merely strong enforcement, but an approach that can be sustained in relative harmony 
with local culture and development.  
 Ultimately wilderness is the home in which culture must find an abode.  Human 
flourishing is mostly animal flourishing, dependent on a healthy soil, flora and fauna.  
We must turn from exploitative, destructive and unsustainable resource use to the 
creative establishment of sustainable niches within the biotic community.  Cultural 
purposes must be fashioned with respect towards nature’s purposes, both as providing 
for the very possibility of culture and as establishing limits on what ought to be done.  
The true ideal of wilderness, of a landscape that functions as a healthy, sustained organic 
community, with Homo sapiens as “plain member and citizen of it,”333 is an important 
intellectual bequest and resource that should not be abandoned.   
 I close, as I began, with words from Thoreau: 
 
Here is this vast, savage, howling mother of ours, Nature, lying all around, with 
such beauty, and such affection for her children, as the leopard.334 
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